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To Group or Not to Group? Evidence from Mutual Funds 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The literature has conflicting reports regarding the impact of group decision making on 
performance. We first observe that in mutual fund studies this results from large discrepancies in 
reported managerial structures between CRSP and Morningstar databases reaching on average 
20% per year. Then we show that with more superior Morningstar data team-managed funds 
exhibit higher risk-adjusted returns than single-managed funds. The performance spread is 
present across all fund categories, except aggressive funds, and is robust to the inclusion of fund- 
and manager-level controls. Across various managerial structures, the largest team-induced gains 
are reached among funds managed by three individuals. Furthermore, teams significantly 
improve fund performance when funds are located in financial centers, reflecting larger 
networking potential and/or better skills of people who reside in larger cities. This improvement 
is achieved in teams more homogeneous in age and education. In spite of higher returns 
however, team-managed funds are not riskier than single-managed funds in terms of market 
exposure or idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, team-managed funds trade less aggressively and are 
able to generate extra inflows for their funds. Thus, collective decision making is beneficial, but 
its scale depends on team size and diversity as well as its geographic location.  
 
 
JEL classifications: G23; J24 
 
Keywords: Knowledge spillover, Management structure, Performance evaluation, Team diversity 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large body of theoretical and empirical studies across a variety of disciplines 
that examines the benefits of group versus individual decision making. The idea that a “group 
mind” is distinctly different from a single one was first put forward by the social psychologist Le 
Bon (1896). From its inception, the concept of a “crowd” has generally been associated with 
negative outcomes, in that people, who are loosely linked to each other but act collectively, are 
believed to pose risks to the established laws and regulations. There is experimental evidence 
that groups may indeed act more aggressively and undertake riskier decisions than the average 
choices of individuals in a group – phenomena known as “risky shifts” (see Wallach and Kogan, 
1965; Stoner, 1968) and “group polarization” (see Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Kerr, 1992; 
Sunstein, 2002).1 In addition, Janis (1982) developed the concept of a “groupthink” where people 
in smaller groups accept decisions they may not fully agree on just to avoid conflicts with their 
colleagues. All these studies imply inferior choices made within groups than among individuals 
resulting from extreme decisions by a dominant player in a team or a reduction in critical 
thinking for the sake of unanimity with other group members.2 
There is an alternative economics and finance literature that highlights the benefits of 
decision making process within groups.3 Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) point out that, while 
individual group members have different opinions, the aggregate “group opinion” is the average 
opinion of all group members. Sharpe (1981) shows that teams in the portfolio management 
industry are able to achieve diversification of style and judgment. Barry and Starks (1984) 
provide a theoretical setting suggesting that teams in investment funds may reduce portfolio risk. 
Very few empirical studies provide support to the opinion and risk diversification theories of 
                                                          
1 Ambrus, Greiner, and Pathak (2009) cast doubts on “group shifts” findings using the standard practice of 
comparing the means of group and individual decisions. 
2 In economics, the negative effect of group decision making is often linked to possible productivity losses resulting 
from free-riding by some members of the teams of firm workers and the ways to reduce this problem (e.g., see 
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982; Rasmusen, 1987; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997). 
3 There is also some support for the “wisdom of a crowd” phenomenon as opposed to not only individual, but also 
even small group decision making advocated by Surowiecki (2005). 
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groups.4 Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003), using data from the garment industry, find that 
teams increase productivity, and that this increase is more apparent among earliest team 
members, high-ability workers, and heterogeneous teams. Adams and Ferreira (2010) analyze 
individual and group bettors in iceberg break-up betting and find that teams arrive to less 
extreme decisions than individuals. 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the effect of teams on fund performance, their risk-
taking behavior and other fund characteristics using a large U.S. equity mutual fund database. 
There are two distinguishing feature of our analysis. First, we focus not only on the examination 
of the individual/team split for fund performance but also on the understanding of the value of an 
extra group member for the benefits of team management. The intuition here is that any group 
work always leads to a tradeoff between a larger intrinsic knowledge base of the group versus a 
difficulty in arriving at optimal decisions, especially under time constraints, which are present in 
many job occupancies, including the mutual fund industry. Second, we differentiate the team 
impact on fund performance across geographic locations, more specifically, between financial 
centers and other cities. The intuition here is that the value of adding a new member to a team 
must to be higher in large cities where each individual is more likely to bring to the group his/her 
unique knowledge, skills, and networking ability. 
Our data comes from Morningstar and covers the period between January 1992 and 
December 2010. Some studies provide evidence of better and more precise coverage of mutual 
funds by Morningstar than CRSP (e.g., see Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2001; Massa, Reuter, and 
Zitzewitz, 2010; Karagiannidis, 2010). However, these papers do not systematize the disparity in 
fund management structure reporting. Therefore, as a first step, we highlight the discrepancies 
between CRSP and Morningstar data on managerial structure of funds. We show that very often 
                                                          
4 Prior evidence in favor of team decision making is based only on studies on signaling games experiments, such as 
Bornstein and Yaniv (1998), Cooper and Kagel (2004), and others. Experimental studies often lead to contradictory 
results. For instance, Bone, Hey, and Suckling, (1999) find no support for the superiority of group decision making. 
Barber, Heath, and Odean (2003) find that groups are more likely to purchase stocks than individuals for “good 
reasons” even though these reasons do not improve performance. In contrast, Blinder and Morgan (2005), based on 
experiments simulating monetary policy decisions by central banks, show that groups achieve better outcomes than 
individuals. 
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CRSP reports single-managed funds while these funds are team-managed in Morningstar, and 
vice versa. The existence of these differences, which in some years in excess of 20% of the 
overall sample of named equity mutual funds, cast serious doubts on the results of many recent 
studies that use fund manager-specific information using CRSP data.5 Indeed, the impact of a 
team on fund performance using an exactly matched sample between CRSP and Morningstar is 
very different for the two datasets. With CRSP data teams have no or negative contribution to 
risk-adjusted returns computed based on unconditional and conditional versions of Carhart 
(1997) model, while with Morningstar data teams show not only positive but also often 
significant addition to fund performance. 
Next, we examine the difference between team and single-managed funds across various 
aspects of fund performance. We observe that on average funds which are team-managed have 
higher risk adjusted returns than their single-managed counterparts. This result holds steadily 
after accounting for a range of fund and manager characteristics and is present across various 
fund investment objectives except those in aggressive growth category. We then examine the 
relation between the size of a fund management team and fund returns. We observe that this 
relation is non-linear. In particular, we find that three-person teams are the largest contributors to 
fund performance relative to single-managed funds. This result corroborates well with the notion 
of increasing problems of free-riding and decreasing cooperation effectiveness in larger groups 
(e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982; Mueller, 2012). We also investigate the 
benefits of group decision making across various locations. We split the sample into funds whose 
advisors are located in six financial centers as defined in Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) 
and those located in smaller cities and repeat our tests. We show that only funds located in 
financial centers gain from team management, interpreting this result as highlighting the 
importance of learning and information spillover effects in larger cities (e.g., see Jacobs 1969; 
                                                          
5 The non-inclusive list of recent studies that use CRSP data on fund management structure include Agarwal and Ma 
(2011), Bar, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2010), Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Cici, (2011), Dass, Nanda, and 
Wang (2011), Deuskar, Pollet, Wang, and Zheng (2011), Han, Noe, and Rebello (2008), Kempf and Ruenzi (2007), 
and Nohel, Wang, and Zheng (2010).  
 5
Glaeser, 1999). Locating in financial centers helps individual members to bring more 
heterogeneous knowledge and skills to their teams and is consistent with diversification benefits 
arising from team work argued by Sharpe (1981). In addition, we find among funds in financial 
centers that those with more diverse team members in terms of age and undergraduate institution 
underperform those with more homogeneous managers. These results are consistent with 
potentially larger frictions and conflicts of interests associated with heterogeneous groups, as 
emphasized in Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999), and career concerns issues in the mutual fund 
industry raised in Chevalier and Ellison (1999b). 
Finally, we analyze whether team-managed funds exhibit different risk-taking behavior 
than single-managed ones and what fund characteristics are associated with team management. 
We find little evidence that team-managed and single-managed funds differ statistically in their 
exposure to total risk, market risk, and idiosyncratic risk. However, the volatility of team-
managed funds is larger in economic terms than their single-managed counterparts. 
Subsequently, we observe that a substantial part of this excess volatility among funds with 
multiple managers comes from their statistically larger loadings on small and value stocks. We 
further show that team-managed funds lead to substantially lower turnover, more than 12% 
annually with a full set of fund and manager characteristic controls. This result implies less 
aggressive trading within groups of portfolio managers and, therefore, provides additional 
support that teams lead to less extreme behavior. Finally, teams help funds bring more money: 
we find positive and significant link between team management and net fund flows reflecting a 
recent trend in mutual fund industry to rely more on team-managed funds.  
The list of empirical finance studies that deal with group and individual decision making 
is not very long. For example, Prather and Middleton (2002) find no evidence of differences in 
fund performance between group and individual decision making, but they deal with data sample 
with large survivorship bias. Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, (2004) find underperformance 
among team-managed funds, while Bar, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2010) find that teams have lower 
risk-adjusted returns and smaller portfolio risk than individual managers. However, both these 
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studies use CRSP data and do not account for manager characteristics. Massa, Reuter, and 
Zitzewitz (2010) compare single, named, and anonymous team management practices. 
Kostovetsky and Warner (2011) study manager turnover differences in equity mutual funds 
while controlling for manager team size, but they do not examine fund performance issues 
related to fund management structure. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the motivation for our 
analysis and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the fund- and manager-level data. In 
section 4, we compare managerial structures reported in CRSP and Morningstar databases and 
then conduct preliminary tests on the importance of team management for fund performance 
using the two data sources. Section 5 presents the main empirical findings of our paper. Section 6 
examines the differences between team-managed and single-managed funds in terms of various 
measures of fund risk and several fund characteristics. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Motivation and Hypotheses Development 
There is widespread evidence nowadays from the industry that mutual funds prefer 
moving towards team management. For example, below is an excerpt from the December 2, 
2011 Reuters report:  
 
Mutual fund star managers have gone the way of the vinyl record: 
They're cool to have, expensive to get, and sometimes, not the best 
quality. In their place, fund companies like Federated Investors, 
Eaton Vance and Invesco are moving in favor of a team-oriented 
approach. Even Fidelity Investments, home of one of the first star 
managers, Peter Lynch, has switched some funds to a team-
managed approach. The move helps fund companies defend 
against poaching, protect their funds’ returns, and shield 
themselves from the level of outflows seen at competing firms 
after their high-profile stars have flamed out.6 
                                                          
6 “Funds move away from star managers, favor teams,” by Jessica Toonkel, December 2, 2011, Thomson Reuters. 
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Recent academic sources also document the same trend (e.g., Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz, 
2010). This evidence however stands in stark contrast with the results of numerous experimental 
and empirical academic studies that have tried, but with little success, to identify benefits of 
group work in various fields of social science, including finance and economics. For instance, 
papers such as Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, (2004), Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz (2010), 
Bar, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2010) among others find that team management in mutual funds 
provides no gains over single-managed funds and even often leads to inferior performance. Some 
literature from economics that finds beneficial impact of teams on productivity and more 
balanced decision making, such as Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) and Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), are based on extremely limited data. Therefore, our main hypothesis, similar to 
most of the aforementioned studies, states the rationale for the existence and the spread of 
teamwork in fund management, namely: 
 
H1. Fund performance is higher among team-managed funds. 
 
Note that the value of group decision making may greatly depend on internal and external 
factors. First, there are many studies that examine team performance as a function of team size. 
For instance, research shows that larger teams may often perform worse than small ones (e.g., 
see Thompson, 2003; Mueller, 2012). While the earlier literature has no clear answer on the 
optimal number of people in a group (on average, varies between five and ten), it is obvious that 
the ideal team size should depend on the tasks performed by individuals within a group. It 
appears that the more diluted the tasks are, the smaller should be the optimal group size. In this 
respect, Mueller (2012) argues that if companies deal with various coordination and motivational 
issues, then any group composed of five or more individuals will already see significant 
increases in coordination costs within the group and diminishing motivation across members of 
the group. Hence, we can state our first prediction as follows: 
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P1. Fund performance is non-linear in the number of team members. 
 
 Second, the value of an additional team member must be greater under those conditions 
when each individual has a higher potential to enhance the overall knowledge and resource base 
of the group. In the fund management industry in particular, skills, knowledge as well as 
networking ability of each team member can be of great importance to fund performance. 
Numerous studies have shown that those conditions are more readily available in larger cities 
(e.g., see Jacobs 1969; Glaeser, 1999; Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2009). Indeed, larger cities, 
especially financial centers, can provide positive externalities to portfolio managers including, 
but not limited to, easier knowledge transfer, faster and more diverse business connections, and 
potential access to private information. Therefore, we can now formulate our second prediction: 
 
P2. Fund performance is higher among team-managed funds located in larger cities. 
 
Finally, numerous studies compare individual and group decision making to the level of 
risk. We follow the arguments in Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991), Sharpe (1981), and Barry and 
Starks (1984) and assume that working in teams does not induce extreme risk taking behavior 
among portfolio managers. Thus, our second hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
 
H2. Team-managed funds do not take excessive risk. 
 
Note that given the inconclusiveness of previous studies on the impact of group decision making 
on fund performance, it is imperative to deal with precise fund managerial structure data. We 
specifically address this issue in the next section.  
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3. Data  
3.1. Main Data Source 
Our primary data source is Morningstar Direct (MS, henceforth), a relatively new 
survivorship-bias free institutional research product offered by Morningstar, Inc. This database 
provides one of the most comprehensive and in-depth coverage of open-ended mutual funds 
across the globe, including the United States. Our sample covers actively managed U.S. 
diversified domestic equity funds with the following investment objectives: Aggressive Growth 
(includes Small Company), Growth, Growth & Income, and Equity Income from 1992 to 2010. 
We exclude all sector funds from our analysis because their portfolios are constrained to follow a 
particular industry and hence are not diversified. We also exclude index funds because majority 
of these funds are not actively managed. MS reports all data at the fund share class level, 
including the names of the fund managers. However, different share classes of the same fund 
might have identical underlying portfolio with the same fund manager(s). This might lead us to 
multiple counting of fund management information and bias our analysis. To avoid such biases, 
we aggregate mutual fund share class level observations to one fund level observation using a 
unique fund identifier in MS.  
To determine whether a fund is sole-managed or team-managed at the end of a calendar 
year, we use the detailed fund manager data which includes fund manager names, the exact date 
a fund manager joins and leaves a particular fund. We classify a fund as sole- or team-managed 
based on the number of fund managers with the fund at the end of calendar year. When only one 
fund manager is named at the end of calendar year, we classify that fund as sole-managed for 
that year. Similarly, when two or more fund managers are named with the fund, we classify the 
fund as team-managed. We remove all fund-years which have missing fund manager names or 
tenure dates from our sample. Our final sample covers 3,935 unique funds with 35,440 manager-
fund-year observations. 
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3.2. Fund Characteristics 
For each fund we obtain information on total net assets under management, expense 
ratios, turnover ratios, fund inception date, and fund family name from MS. This information 
helps us control for fund characteristics that are well known in the literature to affect individual 
fund performance. These characteristics typically include fund size, measured by the total net 
assets under management of the fund at the end of calendar year; fund age, defined as the 
difference between the fund’s inception year and the current year; expenses, measured by the 
annual net expense ratio of the fund; turnover, measured by the turnover ratio of the fund; fund 
family size, measured by the total net assets under management of the fund complex to which the 
fund belongs at the end of calendar year; fund return volatility, measured by standard deviation 
of raw net returns of funds over the past year. We also include net fund flows, defined as the net 
growth in the total net assets of funds, as a percentage of their total net assets, adjusted for prior 
year returns. To minimize the effect of outliers on our analysis, we winsorize expense ratios, 
turnover and annual fund flow variables at 1% and 99% levels. 
Christoffersen and Sarkissian (2009) show that fund managers located in financial centers 
earn higher returns than their peers located in smaller towns. To control this location effect, we 
obtain the location information of fund advisors from MS. Following Christoffersen and 
Sarkissian (2009), we define the following six cities to be financial centers: Boston, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. If the fund advisor company is 
headquartered within a 50-mile radius of any of these six cities, we classify the fund as located in 
the financial center. 
It is important to point that our location variable differs from the previous studies. Instead 
of using the headquarter location of the fund company or fund sponsor (e.g., Christoffersen and 
Sarkissian, 2009), we use the headquarter location of the fund advisor company. For majority of 
funds, the fund advisor and the fund sponsor (the company that offers the mutual fund to public) 
might be the same company (Chen, Hong, and Kubik, 2011). But for few funds they might be 
different because these funds choose to outsource their portfolio management to third-party fund 
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advisor companies. By choosing the fund advisor location, we make analysis immune to the 
possibility of any bias due to third-party fund management outsourcing. 
 
3.3. Fund Manager Characteristics 
In any study that examines potential impact of group decision making on fund 
performance, it is important to control for the influence of manager’s demographic 
characteristics.7 The demographic information available to us includes the name(s) of fund 
manager(s), the name(s) of all funds they currently manage and have managed in the past, their 
start and end dates with those funds, all undergraduate and graduate degrees received, the year in 
which the degrees were granted, and the name of degree-granting institution. In addition, we also 
have a detailed biographical sketch for all fund managers from MS. This sketch is provided to 
MS by the fund managers themselves which includes their personal and past work experience 
details. Following Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), we use these data to create four manager 
characteristics variables: Manager Tenure, MBA dummy, Average SAT, and Manager Age.  
Specifically, we define the manager tenure as the difference between the year when a 
fund manager started as a portfolio manager for a given fund and the current year. To create the 
MBA dummy variable, we use the graduate degree details of each fund manager in our sample. 
We define the MBA dummy variable as one if the fund manager received an MBA degree and 
zero otherwise. To construct the average SAT, we closely follow the methodology of Chevalier 
and Ellison (1999a). First, we obtain the name of the undergraduate institution for each fund 
manager. Then, we look for that institution’s SAT score in the 23-rd edition of Lovejoy’s 
College Guide (see Straughn and Straughn, 1995). Most schools report the upper and lower of 
median verbal and math scores for incoming student in that year. To calculate the composite 
SAT score for a given school, we simply add the average of the upper and lower bounds of the 
verbal score to the average of the upper and lower bounds of the math score. In few cases, 
                                                          
7 Unfortunately, this has not been the case in many papers which attempt to determine the impact of team 
management of fund performance (e.g., Bar, Kempf, and Ruenzi, 2011; Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz, 2010). 
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schools choose to report ACT scores instead of SAT. In those cases, we convert the ACT to an 
equivalent SAT using SAT-ACT concordance tables provided by the College Board.8 
The construction of fund manager age variable is not straightforward because very few 
fund managers in our sample disclose their date of birth in their biographical sketch. To 
overcome this problem, we again follow the methodology proposed by Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999a). For managers who report their date of birth, we simply take the difference between the 
year of their birth and the current year. For managers who do not report their date of birth, we 
construct an approximate manager age variable by assuming that each manager was 21 year old 
upon receiving their undergraduate degree. The limited coverage of undergraduate degree year 
information does reduce our sample size, but does not affect our analysis.  
An important difference between Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) and our study is that they 
focus only on single manager funds, while our study focuses on both single- and team-managed 
funds. It is relatively straightforward to create manager characteristics for single-managed funds. 
But it is somewhat problematic to create manager characteristics for teams of fund managers. 
Ideally, one might be able to create team characteristics based on detailed understanding of the 
contribution of each team member. Unfortunately, we do not have any these data. To overcome 
this problem, we simply assume equal contribution of each team member. Hence, manager 
characteristics for a team, such as manager tenure, age and SAT scores will simply be the 
equally-weighted average of manager tenure, age and SAT scores of each fund manager in the 
team, respectively. For the MBA dummy variable in case of teams, we define it to be one if any 
one of the team members has a MBA degree and zero otherwise.  
 
3.4. Fund Performance Measures 
For computing fund performance measures we use each fund’s monthly net fund returns 
from MS. We use three different performance metrics: objective-adjusted returns, OAR, 
                                                          
8 For more a detailed description of the construction of average SAT score, please refer to Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999a). 
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unconditional four-factor alpha, (4U), using Carhart (1997) model, and conditional four-factor 
alpha, (4C), following the application of Ferson and Schadt (1996) framework to Carhart 
(1997) model. We define OAR as the difference between the average monthly return (net-of-
fees) of a fund in the year minus the mean fund returns across all funds for a given fund 
investment objective and year. We estimate each fund’s unconditional and conditional risk-
adjusted alphas using the following two equations: 
tititititmiiti eUMDmHMLhSMBsrr ,,,   ,              (1) 
and 
    tiTermttmTermiTbillttmTbillititititmiiti eZrbZrbUMDmHMLhSMBsrr ,1,1,,,   ,      (2) 
respectively, where ri,t is the monthly net fund return less the risk-free rate (proxied by the one-
month U.S. T-bill rate), rm,t is the monthly U.S. excess market return (i.e., the return on the 
CRSP Value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq composite index less the one-month U.S. T-bill 
rate), while i is the risk-adjusted return, unconditional in Eq. (1), (4U), and conditional in Eq. 
(2), (4C). SMB, HML, and UMD are returns on the size, book-to-market, and momentum 
portfolios, respectively.9 In equation (2), TbilltZ 1  and 
Term
tZ 1  are the two lagged (demeaned) public 
information variables: the one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate (T-bill) and the term-structure 
spread (Term), defined as the difference in yields on the 10-year U.S. government bond and 
three-month U.S. T-bill. 
Funds change the number of fund managers from year to year. Therefore, we remove all 
fund-years that have less than 12 monthly fund return observations and estimate the fund alphas 
using their prior twelve monthly returns. Although the 12-month horizon gives us fewer data 
points for the estimation than we may want, we believe that given the high frequency of fund 
                                                          
9 These data are from Ken French’s site, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ ken.french/data_library.html. 
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manager turnover, the longer (greater than one year) estimation horizons will introduce bias in 
our analysis by incorrectly attributing  fund performance to a certain type management structure. 
 
3.5. Summary Statistics 
First, in Figure 1, we show the evolution of mutual fund management structure from 1992 
to 2010. It depicts the percentage of single-managed and team-managed funds along with the 
total number of funds in each year of our sample. The total number of funds increased from 
around 750 in the beginning of the sample period to more than 2,000 by 2010, peaking in 2007 
with close to 2,500 funds. Consistent with reports in other studies (e.g., Massa, Reuter, and 
Zitzewitz, 2010), we can see that the proportion of single-managed funds has dropped 
significantly in the last two decades from almost 70% in 1992 to around 30% in 2010. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of mutual funds by the fund management structure, 
where the data on team-managed funds is divided into funds with two managers, three managers, 
four managers, and five managers or more. Panel A reports the distribution (number and 
proportion in percent) of single- and team-managed funds for each year in our sample. While all 
team-managed funds have increased their presence in the industry, multiple-manager funds (five 
and more) have experienced the largest relative and absolute gains in representation, four-fold 
from 4% in 1992 to 16% in 2010. However, the largest proportion of team-managed funds has 
been directed by two managers throughout our sample period. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports three measures of performance, OAR, (4U), and (4C), for 
single and team-managed funds. It also contains information about the difference test in mean 
performance measures between each group of team-managed funds and single-managed funds. 
We can see that team-managed funds show better objective- and especially risk-adjusted 
performance. For example, the difference in OAR between two-manager and single-manager 
funds is 0.014 per month or about 17bp per year, while that between four-manager and single-
manager funds is almost 56bp per year, although this result is statistically insignificant. 
However, both fund alphas show that three-manager funds, and, to some extent, funds managed 
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by five or more people gain the most relative to funds managed by a single person. For three-
manager funds, the differences in (4U) and (4C) are 43bp and 47bp per year, respectively, and 
these results are significant at the 5% level. For five-plus-manager funds, the positive and 
significant difference is observed only with respect to the unconditional alpha measure. Other 
team sizes are not associated with significant outperformance relative to single-managed funds. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports mutual fund characteristics other than performance measures. 
These include fund volatility, total net assets (Find Size), fund age (Fund Age), turnover, and 
expenses. Among other fund characteristics, the notable differences across managerial structures 
include turnover and expenses. Both these measures decrease with an increase in the number of 
fund managers (and expenses decrease monotonically). In addition, fund size tends to increase 
with team size. There are no obvious differences however in fund volatility and age.  
Finally, Panel D of Table 1 reports fund manager characteristics for our five managerial 
structure groups. We notice that the average tenure with the same fund is the highest among 
single-managed funds and so are the average SAT scores. Not surprisingly, funds with larger 
teams are more likely to have at least one manager with an MBA degree. The average age of 
managers appears relatively stable across both single-managed and team-managed funds. 
 
 
4. Management Structure: CRSP versus Morningstar 
4.1. Fund Management Structure Differences 
First of all, we determine the accuracy of funds’ management structure information by 
comparing our MS sample to the widely used CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund 
Database (CRSP, henceforth). Like MS, the unit of observation in CRSP is the fund share class 
and the fund tickers are uniquely assigned to share classes. To avoid double counting of fund’s 
management structure, we aggregate the share class-level information to fund level for each 
fund. We match each fund in our MS sample to CRSP using individual fund tickers and date of 
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inception. In cases where the fund ticker information is missing, we use fund names along with 
their date of inception for matching purposes. We carefully do this matching by hand because 
there are differences in fund naming conventions in both MS and CRSP. MS only reports the 
most recent name adopted by the fund whereas CRSP reports different names adopted by the 
fund over its active life. To ensure the accuracy of our matching strategy, we double check each 
matched fund by hand. At the end, we are able to match 92.78% of our MS sample funds to 
CRSP (3,651 out of 3,935 funds) sample between 1992 and 2010.  
We also classify CRSP sample into single- or team-managed funds. For each fund in a 
given calendar year CRSP reports the name of the fund manager(s) under “Portfolio Manager 
Name” (also known as “mgr_name”) variable. We classify a fund as sole-managed when only 
one manager name is listed and classify as team-managed when two or more managers (or 
phrases such as “Team Managed” and “Investment Committee”) are listed. We remove funds 
from our sample that report the name of the fund company or their advisor(s) under the manager 
name variable. In addition, we also remove fund-year observations for which the manager name 
is not available. We end up with 29,918 manager-fund-year observations in CRSP that represents 
an 84.42% match with our main MS sample. 
The table below provides an example of mismatch between the two data sources. This 
example includes AARP Growth and Income Fund (CRSP Fund No: 53; MS Fundid: 
FSUSA004ZG). 
 
 
      # Fund Managers  
Fund Name (MS) Fund Name (CRSP) Year MS CRSP SEC 
AARP Growth & Income AARP Growth & Income Fund 1992 3 3 - 
AARP Growth & Income AARP Growth Tr: Growth and Income Fund 1993 3 1 - 
AARP Growth & Income AARP Growth Tr: Growth and Income Fund 1994 3 1 - 
AARP Growth & Income AARP Growth Tr: Growth and Income Fund 1995 3 1 3 
AARP Growth & Income AARP Growth Tr: Growth and Income Fund 1996 4 3 4 
AARP Growth & Income AARP Growth Tr: Growth and Income Fund 1997 5 1 5 
AARP Growth & Income AARP Growth Tr: Growth and Income Fund 1998 4 1 4 
AARP Growth & Income AARP Growth Tr: AARP Growth and Income Fund 1999 2 2 2 
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The table compares the fund name as well as the number of fund managers that manage the fund 
at the end of the each calendar year for both CRSP and MS. To test the accuracy of fund 
manager information in both databases, we compare this information to the one provided by the 
fund to the financial regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), each year. We 
hand collect the fund manager information from the fund’s Prospectuses and other filings 
available on SEC’s EDGAR database each year. To determine the number of fund managers in 
the SEC database, we count the names of fund managers listed in the SEC filings at the end of 
the calendar year.10 The first and second columns report the name of the fund given in MS and 
CRSP, respectively. Columns 4-6 show the number of fund managers reported in MS, CRSP, 
and SEC databases in a given year, respectively. The first three rows in the last column have 
missing values because we were unable to find corresponding year’s SEC filings on EDGAR’s 
website. This table shows the managerial structure reported by Morningstar is consistent with 
SEC, but we cannot the say the same thing about CRSP data. 
Table 2 reports the full extent of a misspecification in management structure between 
CRSP and MS datasets for each year in our sample. Column 2 reports the number of matched 
funds. We see that the overlap in funds between the two databases is large in every year of our 
sample and it roughly follows the same trend as the overall number of funds in our sample 
reported in Table 2. Column 3 and 4 as well as 5 and 6 report the percent of single-managed and 
                                                          
10 Creating the number of fund manager variable based on SEC filings is somewhat involved. We start by hand-
collecting the fund’s Prospectus (Form N-1A), Annual Report (Form N-30D), and Post-Effective Amendments 
(Forms POS AM, 497, 485APOS and 485BPOS) available on SEC’s EDGAR database each year. Funds are legally 
required to include the full name, title, length of service, and business experiences of the individuals, including each 
member of portfolio management team who are primarily responsible for the day-to-day management of the fund in 
these filings. In cases where funds employ large portfolio teams, SEC requires the fund to provide information on at 
least five members who share the most significant responsibility for the day-to-day management of the fund's 
portfolio, for example, the managers with the largest percentages of assets under management. Funds are also 
required to disclose any change in fund manager(s) and provide information about the new manager(s) under the 
Securities Act through these filings. Each of these filings contains a filing date, which refers to the date the 
information was made public, and an effectiveness date, which refers to the date the information took effect. We 
then sort these filings based on their effectiveness date for each calendar year. Lastly, to determine the number of 
fund manager(s) in the fund, we simply count the name(s) of the fund manager(s) listed in the last SEC filing at the 
end of the calendar year. Because of the difficulty of doing this exercise over our entire sample of fund-year 
observations, we only checked several randomly chosen funds on the consistency of their Morningstar managerial 
data with SEC filings. 
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team-managed funds in CRSP and MS databases, respectively. We can observe that for the 
whole of 1990s, especially in the beginning of the sample period, CRSP reports much more 
single-managed funds than MS. Towards the 2000s, the overall proportion of single- and team-
managed funds becomes similar between the two databases. Columns 7 to 12 report 
misspecification statistics. Columns 7 and 8 show the number of funds and their proportion that 
is identified as single-managed funds in CRSP but are team-managed in MS. Columns 9 and 10 
show the opposite problem, that is, the number of funds and their proportion that is identified as 
team-managed funds in CRSP but are single-managed in MS. Finally, column 11 gives the total 
number of misspecified funds, while the last column indicates the percent of misspecification in 
the overall matched sample.  
Columns 7-12 of Table 2 easily show that the largest misspecification in managerial 
structure reporting between the two databases occurs in the early part of the sample. The total 
misspecification is higher than 20% of the matched sample for most of the 1990s. However, even 
in the 2000s, when both CRSP and MS report about the same proportion of single- and team-
managed funds (see columns 4 and 6), there is still a significant misreporting in fund 
management structure that never goes below 10% of the sample. Note that the average 
management structure misspecification over the whole sample period is almost 19%. Taking into 
account the fact that we were not able to match about 16% of MS sample with CRSP database, 
the actual misspecification in the reports on the number of managers between the two databases 
is in excess of 20% during the last two decades. The range of misspecification in CRSP is 17% 
to 29% for single-managed funds and 6% to 23% for team-managed funds. Thus, Table 2 
illustrates that the extent of differences in management structure reporting between CRSP and 
MS databases is very large and is likely to have a direct impact on studies using CRSP data in 
analyzing the impact of teams in mutual funds returns. 
 
4.2. Fund Performance Differences 
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Now we proceed to comparing the effect of team management on mutual fund 
performance using CRSP and MS data. The regression model that we deal with has the following 
general form: 
tititititioti eFEControlsMgrControlsFundTeamccPerf ,,3,21,1,1, __    ,        (3) 
where Perfi,t is one of our performance measures, Team is the dummy for multiple-manager 
funds, Fund_Controlsi,t-1 and Mgr_Controlsi,t are the sets of fund- and manager-specific 
characteristics, while FEi,t includes the year and fund investment objective fixed effects. Our 
fund-level controls are lagged by one period to exclude the contemporaneous effect that they 
may have on fund performance. 
Table 3 reports the results of panel regression tests of our two risk-adjusted returns, 
(4U) and (4C), computed in a similar way from CRSP and MS databases on a large set of 
fund and manager characteristics. In this table we again use our matched sample between the two 
databases. The independent variable of interest is Team, defined as a dummy variable which 
equals one if the fund has two (or more) fund managers and zero if it has only one fund manager 
at the end of calendar year. Most of other independent variables are defined in Table 1. To 
reduce the influence of outliers, we take the natural logs of fund size, fund age, and manager age. 
Variable Flows is the net growth in total net assets under management of the fund over the past 
year. SAT score is divided by 100. All fund-level controls are lagged by one period except fund 
age. All regression specifications include time and investment objective fixed effects (FE), and 
the standard errors are clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports the number of 
observations and the adjusted R2.  
Panel A of Table 3 shows full sample estimations. There are 18,437 fund-year 
observations with fund controls alone, but this number drops to 10,982 after the inclusion of 
manager characteristics. Columns 1-4 report the estimation output using CRSP data. Columns 1 
and 2 show the estimates for (4U), without and with fund manager controls, respectively, while 
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columns 3 and 4 show the corresponding estimates for (4C). We can see that in all these 
regressions, the coefficient estimate on Team is negative but statistically insignificant. This result 
could explain conclusions in many papers that use CRSP data that team management does not 
add any positive value for fund performance (e.g., see Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, 2004; 
Bar, Kempf, and Ruenzi, 2011). Columns 5-8 of report the estimation output using MS data. 
Again columns 1 and 2 show the estimates for (4U), while columns 3 and 4 for (4C), again 
without and with fund manager controls, respectively. Now, we see that the results are drastically 
different. The coefficient on Team is consistently positive across all estimations and, even 
though is not always significant, is also economically sizable at least after accounting for both 
fund and manager characteristics. Moreover, at the bottom of the panel we also report the test 
results of the hypothesis that slope coefficients on Team in the corresponding MS and CRSP 
estimations are the same, Team (MS-CRSP) = 0. As one can see, the difference is positive and 
statistically highly significant across all four regression specifications. In economic terms, this 
difference is 43-48bp per year, depending on the type of alpha, for the tests that are based on 
estimates from regression models with a full set of control variables. 
It is worthwhile to mention the estimation results related to our control variables. In 
particular, note that the coefficient estimates and their statistical significance are very consistent 
across both CRSP and MS, unlike the results on the Team dummy, and are in line with results in 
previous studies. Among fund-level characteristics, we observe that fund size and expenses have 
large detrimental effect on performance. These results are similar to findings in many other 
papers.11 However, funds benefit when they are part of a larger family, again consistent with 
earlier studies (Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik, 2004; Pollet and Wilson, 2008). We also 
document persistency in our two risk-adjusted performance measures. Finally, there is also some 
evidence (for (4U)) that higher turnover reduces subsequent returns. As for the manager 
characteristics, consistent with Chevalier and Ellison (1999a) we find a positive and highly 
                                                          
11 For the relation between firm size and performance see Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004); for the relation 
between firm expenses and performance see Jensen (1968), Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993), Carhart (1997) 
and others. 
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significant relation between fund performance metrics and managers’ SAT scores and no relation 
to MBA degree. In addition, our results confirm that fund returns are higher for more 
experienced managers with longer tenures at their respective funds (e.g., see Christoffersen and 
Sarkissian, 2009). Note finally that even though the inclusion of manager characteristics 
drastically reduces the total number of fund-year observations, the adjusted R2 indicate that they 
provide incremental explanatory power for fund returns and therefore are important for proper 
decoupling of the team management effect from manager-specific variables.  
Panel B of Table 3 shows sub-sample estimations over two non-equal periods, 1992-1999 
and 2000-2010. This non-equal time period split is motivated by some of the well-known earlier 
results on the importance of teams for mutual fund returns, such as Chen, Hong, Huang, and 
Kubik (2004), who use CRSP data over the 1992-1999 period and do not find any benefits for 
team management. Each specification controls for fund and manager characteristics but, for the 
sake of convenience, we report only the coefficient on Team dummy alongside with its 
respective p-values. The evidence in Panel A that using MS data leads to significantly more 
positive impact of team management on fund performance is present also in sub-sample 
estimations. The test that slopes on Team for the respective MS and CRSP regressions are the 
same, that is, Team (MS-CRSP) = 0, is rejected for all specifications.  
Thus, Table 3 shows that large discrepancies in management structure records between 
CRSP and MS databases can translate to significant differences in team management impact on 
fund performance. Ceteris paribus, MS data is able to provide much more support for the 
benefits of group decision making in the mutual fund industry. 
 
4.3. Additional Misspecification Issues in Management Structure 
There are two additional implications of the misspecification in management structure 
data in CRSP which are important. First, one can no longer rely on the start dates of fund 
manager(s) provided in this database, particularly in cases where more than one fund manager 
names are listed. The start date (also variable known as “mgr_dt”) in CRSP corresponds to a 
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unique fund manager entry and specifies the date the current manager(s) took control and 
assumed responsibility of the fund. For entries that list one fund manager these dates might be 
less problematic, but for entries that list two or more fund managers these dates might lead to 
serious errors. By giving one start date for funds with two or more fund managers, CRSP leads 
researchers to assume that these managers joined the fund on the same date which might not be 
true in all cases. And this is exactly what we find in MS data, where in almost all team-managed 
funds, different fund managers join the fund on different dates. Second, because CRSP provides 
incomplete information on the number of fund managers (as shown previously), one also cannot 
rely on the name of fund manager(s) provided in this dataset. Particularly, studies on manager 
turnover which use fund manager names from CRSP might be affected from this 
misspecification.     
 
 
5. Team Management and Fund Performance: Empirical Tests 
Having established that a researcher, using MS data, is more likely to find evidence of 
positive contribution of team work in fund management industry, we now directly examine the 
extent of its impact by using our full MS sample. Note that the sample that we use for the 
reminder of the paper is larger than the one used in the CRSP-MS matching tests in Table 3. Our 
goal is to analyze the potential benefits of team management for various fund and/or manager 
characteristics.  
 
5.1. The Average Effect of Team Management  
Table 4 reports the results of the tests on the impact on team management on our three 
measures of fund performance, OAR, (4U) and (4C). We report test results with net (expense-
adjusted) returns in Panel A and gross (expense-unadjusted) returns in Panel B. As in Table 3, all 
regression specifications include time and investment objective fixed effects, and the standard 
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errors are clustered by fund. We also indicate the number of observations and the adjusted R2. 
Again, the variable of interest is the Team dummy. Most of our controls are also similar to those 
in Table 3 with two exceptions. First, given some controversy regarding the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variable in panel tests, we no longer consider lagged performance measures as 
additional independent variables.12 Second, given the evidence of funds returns may be different 
across geographic locations (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 
2009), now include a dummy variable for financial centers (FC) which equals one if the fund is 
in a financial center and zero otherwise. 
In columns 1-3 of Table 4, the dependent variable is the objective-adjusted returns. We 
report the results without and with fund-level and manager-level controls. In Panel A, the Team 
dummy comes up positive in all three regressions and is significant at the 10% level in the most 
comprehensive specification that controls for both fund and manager characteristics. In this latter 
regression, the economic impact of team management on objective-adjusted fund returns is close 
to 40bp per year. In columns 4-6, the dependent variable is the four-factor alpha. In this case, in 
Panel A even without controls, the impact of team management is positive and significant at the 
5% level. After adding fund-level variables, its significance drops slightly to 10%, but with the 
inclusion of manager characteristics, the coefficient on Team becomes significant at the 5% 
level, and its economic magnitude increases by about 50% relative to that in column 4. In 
columns 7-9, the dependent variable is conditional alpha. In Panel A, the coefficient on Team 
again is positive in all three specifications, and while it is a bit less significant in the first two 
regressions relative to the corresponding output in columns 4 and 5, it is again significant at the 
5% level for the most comprehensive last regression specification. In fact, the economic impact 
of team management on conditional alpha after accounting for all fund and manager 
characteristics is 46bp per year. The slopes on most of the control variables in line with those 
                                                          
12 See Maddala and Rao (1973) and Grubb and Symons (1987) among others. 
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reported in Table 3.13 In Panel B of Table 4, we generally see the same pattern as in Panel A. 
There is only a small reduction in economic and statistical significance of the coefficient on 
Team dummy for each estimation vis-à-vis the corresponding test in Panel A. As before, the 
impact of team management on fund performance is the largest after controlling for both fund-
level and manager characteristics. 
We have observed that on average funds with team management practices appear to do 
better than single-managed funds. The next natural inquiry is to determine whether teams benefit 
all type of funds, irrespective of their investment objective. If team-induced performance gains 
are concentrated in a specific fund category, then the most likely explanation for previous 
findings will be not so much related to the benefits that teams brings to fund operations but 
rather to the characteristics of that single fund category. Table 5 reports the results of our tests on 
the impact on team management separately for each of the four fund investment objectives. We 
show the outcome of tests for two risk-adjusted measures of fund performance, (4U) and 
(4C), and report the same set of estimates as in Table 4. The characteristics of regression 
models are also the same as before but they always include both fund- and manager-level 
controls.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show that team management virtually has no impact on 
aggressive growth funds returns. This could be due to the fact that aggressive growth funds are 
believed to be benefitting the most among other fund types from higher turnover rates; therefore, 
coordinating frequent trading decisions among multiple team members may become impeding 
for fund performance. Note also that aggressive growth funds deal with more “soft,” not easily 
available information about stocks and, as Stein (2002) argued, in these cases, single-manager 
structures may be preferable. This is not however the case for other objective categories. As 
shown in columns 3-8, managerial teams have economically and statistically significant, at least 
at 10% level, relation to risk-adjusted returns in all six estimations but one, for (4U) of growth 
                                                          
13 Note that the primary difference in the statistical significance of Team dummy between Table 4 and Table 3 
comes from the increased sample size (e.g., more than 6% in tests with all control variables) rather than small 
changes in the set of control variables. 
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funds.14 Even in this case, the economic impact of team management is 37bp per year, while that 
for growth & income and equity income funds approaches a whapping 1.00% per year. 
Therefore, Table 5 illustrates that having funds managed by teams of managers benefits most of 
fund categories. 
 
5.2. The Effect of an Additional Team Member 
Our previous analysis shows that on average team-managed funds perform better than 
single-managed funds, and this result holds across most of fund investment objectives. Clearly, 
another relevant question is whether the positive relation between team management and fund 
returns is linear in team size. Prior research is very scarce on this issue. The only convincing 
evidence of non-linear benefits of team size is present in Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) 
who find largest increases in productivity of garment industry workers when they join the teams 
at the early stages of team formation. 
Recall from our Table 1 (Panel B) that team size indeed appears to be important to fund 
returns, and that the largest gains in risk-adjusted performance are observed among funds 
administered by three managers. What is necessary to do now is to examine if this pattern 
persists or changes after controlling for our usual sets of fund and manager characteristics. 
Therefore, we run the following regression model: 
titititi
tititititi
eFEControlsMgrControlsFund
FMcFMcFMcFMccPerf
,,3,21,1
,4,3,2,10,
__
5432


  ,          (4) 
where 2FMi,t, is a dummy which equals one if the fund has two fund managers at the end of 
calendar year and zero otherwise; 3FMi,t, is a dummy which equals one if the fund has three fund 
managers at the end of calendar year and zero otherwise; 4FMi,t is a dummy which equals one if 
the fund has four fund managers at the end of calendar year and zero otherwise; and 5FMi,t is a 
                                                          
14 Note that some drop in the statistical significance of Team dummy for growth and equity income funds simply 
occurs because of the reduction in sample size rather than from the decrease in the magnitude of coefficients from 
the full-sample estimation in Table 4. 
 26
dummy which equals one if the fund has five (or more) fund managers at the end of calendar 
year and zero otherwise. The other variables are defined as before. 
 Table 6 shows the estimation results of fund management team size on the two measures 
of risk-adjusted fund performance, (4U), and (4C). Consistent with results of simple 
difference tests in Panel B of Table 1, the three-manager funds add the most of performance 
gains vis-à-vis single-managed funds in terms of both unconditional and conditional alphas. The 
economic value of a three-person team management on fund performance ranges between 50bp 
and 60bp per year for the specification that includes all control characteristics (0.04 and 0.05 
percent per month, respectively). Teams with two managers as well as larger teams (four and 
five or more managers) add less performance gains relative to single-managed funds. These extra 
benefits are not always statistically significant even at the 10% level which is achieved only 
among funds with five or more managers. However, note that not only statistical significance of 
funds managed by five people but also their economic impact decreases with the inclusion of 
control variables, especially after accounting for average manager characteristics. Having said 
that, the economic value of team management for funds that are managed by two, four, or five or 
more managers can still remain sizable, although always less than that for funds managed by 
three people in each respective tests specification. For instance, for funds with five or more 
managers the annual impact of team management on their conditional alpha is 43bp, as reported 
in column 6 (it is 60bp for three-manager funds). 
 Thus, Table 6 confirms our prediction P1 and shows that team size is non-linearly related 
to fund performance. Intuitively, the number of team members determines the tradeoff associated 
with larger knowledge base that more people bring to the team versus coordination costs among 
multiple individuals, as indicated by Mueller (2012) and others. This result is also consistent 
with Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003). Each group member brings his/her specific skills 
and talents, but large cohorts of people with various views on the subject matter may reduce 
productivity due to higher difficulty of arriving to unanimous conclusions.  
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5.3. Team Management and Geographic Location 
 If teams in the financial industry are able to achieve diversification of style and judgment, 
as argued by Sharpe (1981), then the value of having a team must be more profound under those 
conditions when there are more objective reasons for people in groups to have “uncorrelated” to 
each other views. This can occur more easily in larger cities than in smaller communities. 
Indeed, group members in larger cities may have more independent sources of information and 
more diverse networking potential than residents of small towns. Therefore, we test this idea by 
examining now the team impact on fund performance in financial centers versus smaller towns. 
The regression model is as follows, 
titititi
iitititi
eFEControlsMgrControlsFund
FCcFCTeamcTeamccPerf
,,3,21,1
3,2,10,
__ 


,          (5)  
where Teami,tFCi  is the interaction term between the dummies on team management and 
financial center dummies.  
 Table 7 reports the estimation results of fund management team size on our two risk-
adjusted measures of fund performance, (4U), and (4C). Besides reporting the usual outcome 
of estimations, for each regression it also shows the results of the F-test of the hypothesis that the 
performance of team-managed and single-managed funds is the same. These tests are conducted 
separately across funds whose advisors are located in six financial centers and those outside that 
set of cities. Columns 1, 2, and 3 of the table show the estimation results for the unconditional 
alpha without controls, with fund controls only, and with full set of control variables, 
respectively. We can see that in all three specifications, the coefficient on Team is statistically 
zero (sometimes positive, sometimes negative), implying that teams add no gains to performance 
for funds not located in financial centers. The F-test at the bottom of the table restates these 
results. However, the value of a team is diametrically opposite in financial centers. First, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is consistently positive and economically significant, 
indicating extra benefits of team management in financial centers versus other places. Second 
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and more importantly, the F-test shows that in financial centers team-managed funds always 
significantly (at the 5% level) outperform single managed funds.15  
Our estimations with conditional alpha in columns 4-6 of Table 7 lead to the same 
findings. Again, we observe no gains to managing funds in teams if the locations of funds 
advisors are outside financial centers. When funds are in financial centers, the evidence of 
benefits of group-decision making is even higher than before. Both economic and statistical 
results are stronger than in the case of unconditional alpha. For instance, for the regression 
specification with the full set of control variables (column 6), the marginal value of multiple-
manager funds versus single-managed ones is almost 70bp per year, and this difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. All these findings confirm our prediction P2. 
The results in Table 7 support Sharpe (1981) arguments and provide novel evidence that 
group decision making is more beneficial in such environments where group members are more 
likely to acquire knowledge and skills and establish business connections. Clearly, at least in the 
finance industry in general and mutual fund industry in particular, this becomes more achievable 
in financial centers than in smaller cities. Our evidence also highlights a new example of superior 
learning and/or knowledge spillover effects in larger cities as argued by Jacobs (1969), Glaeser 
(1999) and others. 
 
5.4. The Role of Team Diversity 
Besides the tradeoff between group and individual decision making and the determination 
of the optimal size of a team, the other important question is the potential effect of group 
diversity on performance. The literature on diversity in teams has led to inconclusive results 
regarding the impact of group composition on their performance (see Williams and O’Reilly, 
1998; Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale, 1999; Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan, 2003; Van 
Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007). On the positive side, larger diversity in team members may 
                                                          
15 In these tests, we test whether the combined coefficient of the team impact on fund performance, c1+c2, is positive 
and statistically significant since both Team and FC are dummies and here take the value of unity. 
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enhance information processing skills of the group as a whole; on the negative side – significant 
differences among team members may cause frictions, conflicts of interests, and within-group 
biases. Most of the aforementioned studies deal with limited experimental and empirical data. 
Our rich mutual fund dataset with various characteristics of fund managers provides an 
ideal testing ground for the examination of the effect of group diversity on fund performance. In 
particular, we can create diversity proxies across three dimensions of fund manager 
characteristics: tenure with the fund, SAT score, and age. As a diversity measure we use the 
coefficient of variation. It is the ratio of the standard deviation of a variable over its mean, and it 
is a useful statistic for data which can only take non-negative values (e.g., see Allison, 1978). 
Thus, our diversity proxies are:  
)(/)( ,,, tititi TenureTenureDiversityTenure  ,                    (6)  
)(/)( ,,, tititi SATSATDiversitySAT  ,                                (7) 
)(/)( ,,, tititi MAgeMAgeDiversityMAge  ,                    (8)  
where  and  are the standard deviation and mean of the corresponding manager characteristic, 
respectively. The table below reports the summary statistics of these diversity measures. 
 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
Tenure Diversity 0.6313 0.3468 0.0338 2.0718 0.6082 
SAT Diversity 0.0990 0.0574 0.0022 0.3735 0.0945 
MAge Diversity 0.1834 0.1110 0.0111 0.6985 0.1746 
 
All average and median diversity measures are within 0-1 range. The largest spread in these 
measures is observed for the fund tenure diversity, the smallest for SAT score diversity. 
 Table 8 shows the impact of team diversity on fund performance for funds located in 
financial centers and other places. We immediately focus on geographic breakup of our sample 
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since we already determined a primary impact of team management on funds located in larger 
cities. The table reports the estimates from panel regressions of unconditional and conditional 
fund alphas on three team diversity measures defined by Eqs. (6-8), the number of observations, 
and the adjusted R-squares.16 Columns 1 to 4 show the results for funds in financial centers, 
while columns 5 to 8 – in other locations. In columns 1 and 3 financial center fund alphas are 
regressed only on the three manager diversity measures with no any controls. We observe 
significant economic and statistical impact of diversity in SAT scores and manager age on fund 
performance, and this relation is negative. This implies that homogeneous teams in financial 
centers outperform heterogeneous ones. The diversity in manager tenure does not appear to play 
an important role for fund returns. After controlling for the full set of fund and manager 
characteristics, including the team size in columns (2) and (4), our earlier conclusions only 
strengthen. Now, the values and statistical significance of coefficients on manager diversity 
measures based on SAT scores and age increase, while retaining the negative sign. A one 
standard deviation (0.06) increase in the SAT score diversity increases unconditional and 
conditional alphas by about 50bp and 70bp per year, respectively, while one standard deviation 
(0.1) increase in manager age diversity leads up to 60bp annual performance boost based on 
conditional alpha. We do not find any consistent evidence for the importance of diversity in team 
members among funds located outside financial centers, illustrating again the irrelevance of team 
management for fund performance for these types of funds. The only significant outcome occurs 
with manager tenure diversity which results in a positive slope when the dependent variable is 
conditional alpha after controlling for fund and other manager characteristics.  
Thus, our findings support other papers on team diversity that highlight more problems 
than benefits associated with grouping people with different characteristics into the same teams 
(e.g., Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale, 1999). The results are also consistent with career concerns 
                                                          
16 Note that our sample size now is much lower than in the earlier tests. This drop occurs for the following two 
reasons. First, in the current tests we use only team-managed funds. Second, when only one manager in a team has 
identifiable characteristic, it is impossible to compute the diversity measure based on this characteristic. However, 
these observations still contribute to the sample that contains average manager characteristics. 
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issues in mutual funds (e.g., see Chevalier and Ellison, 1999b). Managers with large differences 
in incentives and career options, stemming from differences in their educational background and 
age, are unlikely to collaborate well on such vaguely defined issues as fund portfolio 
composition and trading activity. 
 
 
6. Team Management, Risk Taking, and Fund Characteristics 
 After analyzing various aspects of performance differences between team-managed and 
single-managed funds in the earlier part of the paper, in this section, we examine whether there 
exist systematic differences in risk taking and other fund characteristics that can be distinctly 
attributed to group decision making in mutual fund industry. First, recall that the existing 
literature is unclear on the impact of team on risk taking. Some studies, such as Wallach and 
Kogan (1965), Stoner (1968), Sunstein (2002), and others find that groups could act more 
aggressively and undertake more risk. Other studies, however, such as Barry and Starks (1984) 
and Adams and Ferreira (2009), provide theoretical and some empirical evidence that groups, 
may in fact, reduce risk. To address these issues within our framework, we use the following 
model:  
titititititi eFEControlsMgrControlsFundTeamddRisk ,,3,21,1,10, __    ,        (7) 
where Riski,t is one of fund’s i risk measures at time t. We consider several risk measures. The 
first is the total volatility of the fund. The second is market risk and the idiosyncratic residual 
volatility coming from the standard CAPM. The final set comes from the Carhart (1997) model 
(see Eq. (1)) and includes market beta, the loadings on size, book-to-market and momentum 
portfolios, as well as the idiosyncratic residual volatility from this model.  
 Table 8 reports the results of the estimation of the impact of team management on various 
risk measures. In this table, the market and residual risk from the CAPM are denoted by Mrk1 
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and IdVol1, respectively, while these risks from the Carhart (1997) model as Mrk4 and IdVol4, 
respectively. Each regression specification includes a full set of fund and manager controls as in 
previous tests with the exception of two fund-level variables, namely, fund family size and net 
flows. There are no a priori expectations about the impact of those two variables have on risk 
characteristics of funds. We can see that team management has no statistically significant impact 
on funds’ total risk, market risk, or idiosyncratic risk, irrespective whether the latter two 
measures are estimated based on the CAPM or Carhart (1997) model. One could still argue that 
the total risk of team managed funds, even though being insignificant statistically, is large in 
economic sense, reaching almost 1% per year (0.0797*12). However, the two metrics of the 
idiosyncratic risk, IdVol1 and IdVol4, that have different signs as well as economically similar 
yet small exposures to the market portfolio, Mrk1 and Mrk4 imply at best potential exposure to 
non-conventional risk measures. Indeed, we observe that team-managed funds load more on 
small firms and high book-to-market firms: the coefficients on SMB and HML are both positive 
and significant. Among control variables, the most consistent results for market risk are that we 
find that it increases for large funds and funds with higher turnover rates. Also, we note that fund 
age has negative and almost everywhere statistically significant impact on risk across most of its 
measures except momentum. 
In sum, Table 8 illustrates that the impact of group-decision making on fund risk taking 
behavior is not very straightforward. Team-managed funds do not seem to take more market risk, 
and their volatility, both total and risk-adjusted, is also non-excessive, but they may expose 
themselves more to other possible measures of risk than single-managed funds.  
 Next, we look if team management is associated with specific fund characteristics using 
the regression setting below: 
titititititi eFEControlsMgrControlsFundTeamddFundChar ,,3,21,1,10, __    ,      (8) 
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where FundChari,t is one of fund’s i characteristics at time t. Four fund characteristics are 
relevant for our analysis: Expenses, turnover, fund size and net flows. Clearly, in these 
regression models, our set of fund-level control variables must depend on the fund characteristic 
in question. 
 Table 9 reports the results of tests based on Eq. (8). The table has 12 columns, three 
regression specifications per each fund characteristic. Columns 1-3 show the results for fund 
expenses. Consistent with Table 1 data, we find that team-managed funds are generally cheaper 
for investors. This result is significant with fund-level controls but, with the sample reduction 
after the addition of manager-level controls, drops to insignificance. Columns 4-6 show the 
results for fund turnover. We observe that team management drastically reduces the trading 
frequency of funds and this drop is statistically significant. For instance, in economic terms, an 
average team-managed fund reduces annual turnover by 12.4% relative to a single-managed fund 
with similar fund and manager characteristics. Columns 7-9 show the results for fund size. A 
priori, one can think that larger funds are more likely to have teams of portfolio managers. 
However, just like Table 1 provides no clear signs that multiple-manager funds are usually 
larger, the estimation results in the current table that account for control variables also give no 
convincing support for any relation between team management and fund size.17 Finally, in 
columns 10-12, we show the impact of teams on generating fund flows. In these tests, we follow 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) and, besides controlling for the standard set of fund characteristics, also 
the lagged unconditional alpha, (4U)i,t-1, and the lagged flows to funds with the same 
investment objective, Obj Flowsi,t-1. We find that team-managed funds are able to generate 
significantly higher net flows to their respective funds. This statistically significant result 
becomes even stronger after the incorporation of managerial controls in the last column of the 
table. Our finding that team-managed funds increase fund flows is also consistent with recent 
trend of the increase of proportion of multiple-manager funds. 
 
                                                          
17 Our set of fund-level control variables also include lagged fund size as in Chevalier and Ellison (1999a). 
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we revisit the question on the benefits of collective versus individual 
decision making. Few studies exist in economics literature that estimate the impact of a team on 
worker productivity and risk taking in rather indirect ways basing their findings on relatively 
limited data. Using detailed managerial-level data from mutual funds allows one to directly 
observe any differences in various aspects of performance and risk preferences between single-
managed and team-managed funds. However, prior research in this area has been largely relying 
on CRSP dataset and the prevailing conclusion has been multiple-manager funds perform no 
better if not worse than solo-manager ones.  
We use mutual fund data from Morningstar and first meticulously show that there exist 
large discrepancies in managerial structure reporting between this database and CRSP. This 
misspecification averages about 20% per year over our sample period of 1992-2010. More 
importantly, using more reliable Morningstar data we provide compelling evidence that team 
management has on average a positive impact on fund risk-adjusted returns across all fund 
investment objectives except aggressive growth. In these tests, we are able to control for a range 
of fund-level and manager-specific characteristics.  
We further show that the influence of a group decision making on fund performance is 
non-linear in team size and is not uniform across all geographic locations. Funds benefit the most 
from a team work of three portfolio managers. This may indicate the potential trade-off between 
the benefits of collective wisdom and increasing coordination and/or free-rider issues that 
become more problematic in larger groups. Also, the benefits of team management are strongly 
present among funds in financial centers but not outside those locations. This outcome is 
consistent with the idea that larger cities provide wider opportunities for learning and knowledge 
spillovers, so the potential contribution of each manager to fund activities in larger cities is 
higher than in smaller towns. We observe that team management practice in financial centers is 
 35
effective among funds with more homogeneous managers along education and age dimensions, 
possibly reflecting the benefits of more alignment in career concerns. Finally, we show that 
among other benefits of team-managed funds are substantially lower turnover and ability to 
attract new money flows into their funds.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of mutual funds management structure 
 
 
Panel A: Distribution of single and team-managed funds  
 1 Manager  2 Managers 3 Managers 4 Managers  5+ Managers 
 Number Percent  Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent  Number Percent
1992 519 67  145 19 70 9 17 2  29 4 
1993 584 63  202 22 78 8 20 2  39 4 
1994 672 64  243 23 85 8 23 2  35 3 
1995 729 61  273 23 115 10 30 3  45 4 
1996 767 57  350 26 121 9 57 4  46 4 
1997 859 56  399 26 161 11 63 4  48 3 
1998 921 53  449 26 210 12 67 4  84 5 
1999 961 51  494 26 258 14 81 5  99 6 
2000 987 49  587 29 253 12 90 5  116 6 
2001 1004 47  602 28 272 13 115 6  134 7 
2002 1000 46  647 30 283 13 120 6  137 7 
2003 971 44  662 30 287 13 145 7  161 8 
2004 876 39  659 30 320 14 174 9  196 10 
2005 832 35  698 29 335 14 226 11  300 14 
2006 802 33  731 30 352 14 222 11  346 16 
2007 776 31  748 30 363 15 247 12  333 16 
2008 776 32  732 30 356 15 243 12  327 16 
2009 719 31  691 30 392 17 189 9  315 16 
2010 622 29  666 31 398 19 164 9  293 16 
Total 15377 43  9978 28 4709 13 2293 7  3083 10 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Fund performance of single and team-managed funds 
 1 Manager  2 Managers 3 Managers 4 Managers  5+ Managers 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
OAR 0.001 1.347  0.015 1.283 0.018 1.157 0.048 1.480  0.037 0.975 
   Diff    0.014  0.017  0.047   0.036  
   p-value    (0.447)  (0.470)  (0.147)   (0.176)  
(4U) -0.042 0.796  -0.031 0.765 -0.006 0.738 -0.029 0.788  -0.005 0.603 
   Diff    0.011  0.036**  0.013   0.037**  
   p-value    (0.342)  (0.017)  (0.528)   (0.031)  
(4C) -0.006 0.857  -0.003 0.822 0.033 0.793 0.009 0.866  0.018 0.659 
   Diff    0.003  0.039**  0.015   0.024  
   p-value    (0.806)  (0.016)  (0.498)    (0.188)   
 
  
Panel C: Fund characteristics of single and team-managed funds 
 1 Manager  2 Managers 3 Managers 4 Managers  5+ Managers 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Volatility 4.728 2.567  4.820 2.647 4.981 2.638 4.756 2.701  4.715 2.262 
TNA 914 3,800  667 2,030 864 2,690 941 3,450  2,310 10,300 
Fund Age 10.240 12.569  10.208 12.185 10.201 12.209 9.193 10.514  10.615 11.446 
Turnover 0.913 0.843  0.856 0.698 0.906 0.745 0.828 0.630  0.807 0.627 
Expenses 1.316 0.475  1.292 0.437 1.270 0.424 1.244 0.410  1.178 0.407 
 
 
Panel D: Fund manager characteristics of single and team-managed funds 
 1 Manager  2 Managers 3 Managers 4 Managers  5+ Managers 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Tenure  4.42 4.80  3.83 3.60 3.67 3.20 3.52 3.2  3.61 2.9 
SAT  1157.44   139.12  1146.17   116.13  1143.16     99.95 1139.86 93.01  1145.23 79.91 
MBA       0.53 0.50  0.70 0.46 0.80 0.40 0.87 0.34  0.95 0.23 
Mage     45.90       9.56  44.99 8.83 44.34 8.53 44.32 8.53  44.48 7.09 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
This table gives the summary statistics of domestic equity mutual funds in the United States from 1992 to 2010. 
Panel A reports the number (and percentage) of funds managed by one, two, three, four, and five (or more) fund 
managers each year. Panel B report the mean and standard deviation of three fund performance measures. OAR (%, 
per month) is investment objective adjusted fund return, which is the difference between the average monthly net 
fund return for fund i in year t and the average monthly fund return of all funds in the matched investment objective 
in year t. (4U) and (4C) are the monthly risk-adjusted net fund returns using unconditional and conditional 
versions of Carhart (1997) four-factor model, respectively. The panel also shows the difference in performance test 
results between each group of team-managed funds and single-managed funds. Panel C reports the mean and 
standard deviation of different fund characteristics over the entire sample period. Volatility (%) is the standard 
deviation of monthly fund returns over the past 12 months for fund i in year t. TNA ($, millions) is the total net asset 
under management of fund i in year t. Fund Age (years) is the difference between fund i’s inception year and the 
current year t. Turnover is the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities of the year divided 
by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. Expenses (%) is the annual total expense ratio of the fund i in 
year t. Panel D reports fund manager characteristics following Chevalier and Ellison (1999). Tenure (years) is the 
number of years the fund manager remains with the fund i at time t. SAT is the SAT score of matriculates of the 
fund manager’s undergraduate institution. MBA is defined as a dummy variable which equals one when a fund 
manager (or at least one of the team members) has MBA degree and zero otherwise. MAge (years) is the fund 
manager’s age at current year t. Important note: In case of teams, we simply take the average for each of these 
characteristics: Tenure, SAT and MAge.  
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Table 2 
Misspecification in management structure: CRSP versus Morningstar 
 
 
        Misspecification 
Year Matched # Funds 
 CRSP  Morningstar Single(CRSP) - Team(MS) Team(CRSP) - Single(MS) # Misspecified 
Funds 
% Matched 
Sample  % Single % Team  % Single % Team # Funds % Single(CRSP) # Funds % Team(CRSP)
1992 582  80.76 19.24  67.87 32.13 89 18.94 14 12.50 103 17.70 
1993 720  81.94 18.06  64.58 35.42 147 24.92 22 16.92 169 23.47 
1994 835  79.64 20.36  63.35 36.65 176 26.47 40 23.53 216 25.87 
1995 946  78.22 21.78  61.42 38.58 196 26.49 37 17.96 233 24.63 
1996 1040  69.04 30.96  58.17 41.83 173 24.09 60 18.63 233 22.40 
1997 1238  63.25 36.75  56.54 43.46 166 21.20 83 18.24 249 20.11 
1998 1560  60.90 39.10  54.17 45.83 222 23.37 117 19.18 339 21.73 
1999 1668  54.02 45.98  50.84 49.16 177 19.64 124 16.17 301 18.05 
2000 1678  52.26 47.74  48.63 51.37 197 22.46 136 16.98 333 19.85 
2001 1798  50.17 49.83  47.94 52.06 183 20.29 143 15.96 326 18.13 
2002 1864  47.64 52.36  46.51 53.49 190 21.40 169 17.32 359 19.26 
2003 1933  42.42 57.58  44.28 55.72 145 17.68 181 16.26 326 16.86 
2004 1940  33.04 66.96  40.21 59.79 116 18.10 255 19.63 371 19.12 
2005 2015  33.20 66.80  35.33 64.67 184 27.50 227 16.86 411 20.40 
2006 2068  33.70 66.30  33.46 66.54 203 29.12 198 14.44 401 19.39 
2007 2129  31.38 68.62  31.75 68.25 122 18.26 130 8.90 252 11.84 
2008 2110  30.19 69.81  32.65 67.35 122 19.15 174 11.81 296 14.03 
2009 1928  30.39 69.61  31.64 68.36 116 19.80 140 10.43 256 13.28 
2010 1866   30.98 69.02  29.80 70.20  105 18.17  83 6.44  188 10.08 
 
This table describes the nature and extent of misspecification in the management structure of the U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from 1992 to 2010. Using a 
matched sample of mutual funds in the CRSP and Morningstar (MS) mutual fund database, the first columns in the table report the percentage of mutual funds 
classified as reporting one manager name (Single-managed), reporting two or more manager names (Team-managed) in both databases by year. In both cases the 
unit of observation is the mutual fund, not the fund share class. Columns seven to twelve report the extent of management structure misspecification in the 
matched sample by year. Column seven reports the number of funds that are classified as single-managed in CRSP but are team-managed in MS in the same 
calendar year. Column eight reports these misspecified funds as a percentage of all funds classified as single-managed in CRSP. Similarly, column nine reports 
the number of funds that are identified as team-managed in CRSP but are single-managed in MS. Column ten reports these misspecified funds as a percentage of 
all funds classified as team-managed in CRSP. Columns eleven and twelve report the total number of misspecified funds and express it as a percentage of total 
matched sample each year. 
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Table 3 
Effect on team management on fund performance: CRSP versus Morningstar 
 
 
Panel A: Full matched sample analysis  
 CRSP Morningstar 
  (4U) (4U) (4C) (4C) (4U) (4U) (4C) (4C) 
Team -0.0012 -0.0108 -0.0033 -0.0058 0.0134 0.0247 0.0127 0.0340** 
 (0.912) (0.475) (0.777) (0.728) (0.204) (0.106) (0.266) (0.039) 
Fund Sizei,t-1 -0.0270*** -0.0316*** -0.0260*** -0.0243*** -0.0272*** -0.0321*** -0.0262*** -0.0248***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fund Agei,t -0.0035 -0.0166* -0.0092 -0.0304*** -0.0031 -0.0175* -0.0087 -0.0316***
 (0.629) (0.076) (0.244) (0.003) (0.672) (0.061) (0.269) (0.002) 
Family Sizei,t-1 0.0122*** 0.0128*** 0.0125*** 0.0085** 0.0123*** 0.0134*** 0.0126*** 0.0092** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.032) 
Expensesi,t-1 -0.0573*** -0.0585*** -0.0457*** -0.0472** -0.0568*** -0.0571*** -0.0451*** -0.0455** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.022) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.027) 
Turnoveri,t-1 -0.0271*** -0.0224* -0.0050 0.0137 -0.0268*** -0.0212* -0.0047 0.0153 
 (0.003) (0.078) (0.622) (0.334) (0.003) (0.097) (0.644) (0.280) 
Flowsi,t-1 -0.0043 -0.0026 -0.0057* -0.0057 -0.0043 -0.0026 -0.0057* -0.0057 
 (0.150) (0.468) (0.075) (0.126) (0.153) (0.464) (0.077) (0.123) 
Performancei,t-1 0.0948*** 0.1027*** 0.0782*** 0.0809*** 0.0948*** 0.1025*** 0.0782*** 0.0805*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenurei,t  0.0038**  0.0044**  0.0045***  0.0052*** 
  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
SATi,t  0.0220***  0.0196***  0.0230***  0.0208*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
MBAi,t  0.0093  -0.0021  0.0015  -0.0112 
  (0.587)  (0.917)  (0.928)  (0.571) 
MAgei,t  -0.0838**  -0.1010**  -0.0789*  -0.0952** 
  (0.038)  (0.017)  (0.051)  (0.025) 
Constant 0.1668** 0.3841** 0.1248 0.4854** 0.1611** 0.3366* 0.1189 0.4286** 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.132) (0.014) (0.032) (0.065) (0.153) (0.031) 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 12.65 13.33 12.76 13.31 12.66 13.35 12.76 13.34 
Obs. 18,437 10,982 18,437 10,982  18,437 10,982 18,437 10,982 
Team (MS-CRSP) = 0     0.0146*** 0.0355*** 0.0160*** 0.0398*** 
p-value     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-period analysis 
  CRSP Morningstar 
 1992-1999 2000-2010 1992-1999  2000-2010 
  (4U) (4C) (4U) (4C) (4U) (4C)  (4U) (4C) 
Team -0.0020 0.0213 0.0015 -0.0165 0.0215 0.0520*  0.0122 0.0153 
 (0.941) (0.515) (0.892) (0.314) (0.400) (0.086)  (0.298) (0.402) 
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Mgr. Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes  No Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 5.42 5.66 15.13 16.37 5.43 5.74  15.14 16.37 
Obs. 3,626 2,618 14,811 8,364  3,626 2,618  14,811 8,364 
Team (MS-CRSP) = 0     0.0235*** 0.0307***  0.0107*** 0.0319*** 
p-value     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
This table compares the effect of management structure on fund performance across CRSP and Morningstar 
databases using a panel regression approach on matched sample from 1992 to 2010. Panel A reports regression 
estimates of the matched funds across full sample period using both databases, while Panel B reports regression 
estimates of the matched funds across two sub-periods. The dependent variable includes two performance measures, 
(4U) and (4C), which are the monthly risk-adjusted net fund returns using unconditional and conditional versions 
of Carhart (1997) four-factor model, respectively. The independent variable of interest is Team, defined as a dummy 
variable which equals one if the fund has two (or more) fund managers and zero if it has only one fund manager at 
the end of calendar year. Other independent variables include various fund and manager characteristics as controls. 
Fund Size is the log of total net assets under management of the fund. Fund Age is the log of the difference between 
the fund’s inception year and the current year. Family Size is the log of total net asset under management of the 
fund’s family. Expenses is the annual total expense ratio of the fund. Turnover is the minimum of aggregated sales 
or aggregated purchases of securities of the year divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. Flows 
is the net growth in total net assets under management of the fund over the past year. Performance is the 
corresponding lagged fund performance measure, (4U) or (4C). Tenure is the number of years the fund manager 
remains with the fund. SAT is the SAT score (divided by 100) of matriculates of the fund manager’s undergraduate 
institution. MBA is defined as a dummy variable which equals one when a fund manager (or at least one of the team 
members) has MBA degree and zero otherwise. Manager Age is the log of fund manager’s age in current year. All 
regression specifications include time and investment objective fixed effects (FE), and the standard errors are 
clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports the p-values of coefficients, the number of observations and 
the adjusted R2. Team (MS-CRSP) is the hypothesis that slope coefficients on Team in the corresponding 
Morningstar and CRSP estimations are the same and p-value is the p-value of this test. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 
Effect of team management of fund performance 
 
Panel A: Tests with net (expense-adjusted) returns 
  OAR  (4U)  (4C) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Teami,t 0.0237 0.0128 0.0308* 0.0216** 0.0181* 0.0320** 0.0189* 0.0184 0.0381** 
 (0.154) (0.332) (0.094) (0.031) (0.100) (0.043) (0.081) (0.118) (0.025) 
Fund Sizei,t-1  -0.0384*** -0.0555***  -0.0211*** -0.0253***  -0.0225*** -0.0211***
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Fund Agei,t  0.0048 -0.0048  -0.0138* -0.0284***  -0.0142* -0.0382***
  (0.631) (0.696)  (0.080) (0.004)  (0.093) (0.000) 
Family Sizei,t-1  0.0126*** 0.0208***  0.0104*** 0.0110***  0.0106*** 0.0080* 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.060) 
Expensesi,t-1  -0.0214 -0.0462*  -0.0414** -0.0532***  -0.0369** -0.0472** 
  (0.311) (0.056)  (0.011) (0.007)  (0.041) (0.028) 
Turnoveri,t-1  0.0377*** 0.0372**  -0.0279*** -0.0241*  -0.0196* -0.0046 
  (0.005) (0.031)  (0.004) (0.072)  (0.069) (0.746) 
Volatilityi,t-1  -0.0307** -0.0063  -0.0112** -0.0068  0.0235*** 0.0261*** 
  (0.017) (0.786)  (0.033) (0.339)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Flowsi,t-1  -0.0025 -0.0057  -0.0001 0.0008  -0.0027 -0.0033 
  (0.411) (0.169)  (0.974) (0.818)  (0.346) (0.356) 
FCi  0.0110 -0.0007  -0.0047 -0.0079  -0.0051 0.0104 
  (0.378) (0.965)  (0.663) (0.571)  (0.663) (0.491) 
Tenurei,t   0.0078***   0.0060***   0.0071*** 
   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
SATi,t   0.0321***   0.0212***   0.0188*** 
   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.005) 
MBAi,t   0.0293   0.0005   -0.0091 
   (0.174)   (0.979)   (0.645) 
MAgei,t   -0.0017   -0.1032**   -0.1310***
   (0.971)   (0.012)   (0.002) 
Constant 0.0098 0.5517*** 0.2223 -0.0556** 0.1569** 0.4361** -0.0996*** 0.0213 0.4687** 
 (0.751) (0.000) (0.296) (0.049) (0.044) (0.019) (0.001) (0.801) (0.019) 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) -0.04 1.93 2.99 11.02 11.90 12.77 11.09 12.31 13.25 
Obs. 31,440 20,565 12,135  26,703 19,781 11,646  26,703 19,781 11,646 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Tests with gross (expense-unadjusted) returns 
  OAR  (4U)  (4C) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Teami,t 0.0179 0.0091 0.0288 0.0172* 0.0159 0.0302* 0.0145 0.0163 0.0362** 
 (0.273) (0.482) (0.112) (0.082) (0.142) (0.056) (0.177) (0.161) (0.032) 
Fund Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Mgr. Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) -0.05 2.16 3.22 10.86 11.91 12.82 10.97 12.54 13.49 
Obs. 31,440 20,565 12,135  26,703 19,781 11,646  26,703 19,781 11,646 
 
This table shows the effect of management structure on fund performance using the Morningstar U.S. domestic 
equity mutual fund sample from 1992 to 2010. It reports the estimates from panel regressions of fund performance 
on management structure (team versus single) and other controls. Panel A shows test results with net (expense-
adjusted) returns; Panel B – with gross (expense-unadjusted) returns. The dependent variable includes three 
performance measures: OAR, (4U), and (4C). OAR is the difference between the average monthly net fund 
return for the fund in year t and the average monthly net fund returns of all funds in the matched investment 
objective in year t. (4U) and (4C) are the monthly risk-adjusted net fund returns using unconditional and 
conditional versions of Carhart (1997) four-factor model, respectively. The independent variable of interest is Team, 
defined as a dummy variable which equals one if the fund has two (or more) fund managers and zero if the fund has 
only one fund manager at the end of calendar year. Other independent variables include various fund and manager 
characteristics as controls. Fund Size is the log of total net assets under management of the fund. Fund Age is the log 
of the difference between the fund’s inception year and the current year. Family Size is the log of total net asset 
under management of the fund’s family. Expenses is the annual total expense ratio of the fund. Turnover is the 
minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities of the year divided by the average 12-month 
total net assets of the fund. Flows is the net growth in total net assets under management of the fund over the past 
year. Volatility (%) is the standard deviation of monthly net fund returns over the past 12 months for the fund. FC is 
the dummy variable which equals one if the fund is in a financial center and zero otherwise. Financial center funds 
have headquarters located within 50 miles of Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, or San 
Francisco. Tenure is the number of years the fund manager remains with the fund. SAT is the SAT score (divided by 
100) of matriculates of the fund manager’s undergraduate institution. MBA is defined as a dummy variable which 
equals one when a fund manager (or at least one of the team members) has MBA degree and zero otherwise. MAge 
is the log of fund manager’s age in current year. All regression specifications include time and investment objective 
fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports the p-values of 
coefficients, the number of observations and the adjusted R2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Effect of team management of fund performance by investment objective 
 
 
  Aggressive Growth  Growth   Growth & Income    Equity Income 
  (4U) (4C) (4U) (4C) (4U) (4C)  (4U) (4C) 
Teami,t -0.0010 -0.0179 0.0305 0.0388* 0.0736*** 0.0833***  0.0765* 0.0804* 
 (0.981) (0.696) (0.151) (0.082) (0.005) (0.003)  (0.050) (0.051) 
Fund Sizei,t-1 -0.0286* -0.0297* -0.0264*** -0.0202*** -0.0250*** -0.0200*  -0.0078 -0.0063 
 (0.092) (0.076) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) (0.065)  (0.622) (0.725) 
Fund Agei,t -0.0194 -0.0144 -0.0267** -0.0374*** -0.0298* -0.0343**  -0.0545 -0.0835** 
 (0.535) (0.662) (0.039) (0.007) (0.054) (0.046)  (0.137) (0.025) 
Family Sizei,t-1 0.0112 0.0137 0.0085* 0.0039 0.0213*** 0.0200**  -0.0018 -0.0064 
 (0.304) (0.220) (0.092) (0.478) (0.005) (0.015)  (0.892) (0.673) 
Expensesi,t-1 -0.0601 -0.0589 -0.0448* -0.0330 -0.1044*** -0.1071***  0.1230 0.0714 
 (0.211) (0.270) (0.087) (0.232) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.124) (0.462) 
Turnoveri,t-1 -0.0256 -0.0037 -0.0334** -0.0106 0.0296 0.0326  0.0517 0.0451 
 (0.559) (0.931) (0.025) (0.521) (0.142) (0.192)  (0.461) (0.573) 
Volatilityi,t-1 -0.0247** 0.0062 -0.0016 0.0273*** 0.0026 0.0495**  -0.0067 0.0100 
 (0.016) (0.567) (0.871) (0.003) (0.885) (0.040)  (0.835) (0.786) 
Flowsi,t-1 0.0111 0.0043 -0.0022 -0.0060 0.0035 0.0076  -0.0057 -0.0051 
 (0.216) (0.631) (0.604) (0.177) (0.590) (0.368)  (0.528) (0.581) 
FCi -0.0304 -0.0116 -0.0149 0.0024 0.0221 0.0270  -0.0059 -0.0044 
 (0.350) (0.756) (0.423) (0.902) (0.393) (0.352)  (0.903) (0.931) 
Tenurei,t 0.0101* 0.0121** 0.0052** 0.0050** 0.0070** 0.0110**  0.0030 0.0127** 
 (0.074) (0.036) (0.010) (0.021) (0.030) (0.024)  (0.614) (0.019) 
SATi,t 0.0273* 0.0166 0.0260*** 0.0259*** 0.0067 0.0046  -0.0416* -0.0412 
 (0.064) (0.291) (0.001) (0.002) (0.521) (0.715)  (0.085) (0.118) 
MBAi,t -0.0319 -0.0553 -0.0004 -0.0030 -0.0334 -0.0667*  0.0854 0.1554*** 
 (0.514) (0.281) (0.987) (0.909) (0.260) (0.057)  (0.127) (0.003) 
MAgei,t 0.0068 -0.0753 -0.1463*** -0.1800*** -0.0810 -0.0514  -0.0404 -0.0581 
 (0.950) (0.499) (0.005) (0.001) (0.342) (0.561)  (0.767) (0.679) 
Constant -0.1863 0.0375 0.6879*** 0.5771** 0.1575 -0.3166  0.4302 0.5282 
 (0.696) (0.939) (0.006) (0.039) (0.696) (0.471)  (0.528) (0.462) 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 15.23 15.06 13.84 13.42 15.66 18.00  16.04 18.42 
Obs. 2,402 2,402  6,908 6,908  1,761 1,761   575 575 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
 
This table shows the effect of management structure on fund performance using the Morningstar U.S. domestic 
equity mutual fund sample from 1992 to 2010. It reports the estimates from panel regressions of fund performance 
on management structure (team versus single) and other controls and other controls across four different MS 
investment objective categories: Aggressive Growth, Growth, Growth & Income, and Equity Income. The 
dependent variable includes two performance measures, (4U) and (4C), which are the monthly risk-adjusted net 
fund returns using unconditional and conditional versions of Carhart (1997) four-factor model, respectively. The 
independent variable of interest is Team, defined as a dummy variable which equals one if the fund has two (or 
more) fund managers and zero if the fund has only one fund manager at the end of calendar year. Other independent 
variables include various fund and manager characteristics as controls. Fund Size is the log of total net assets under 
management of the fund. Fund Age is the log of the difference between the fund’s inception year and the current 
year. Family Size is the log of total net asset under management of the fund’s family. Expenses is the annual total 
expense ratio of the fund. Turnover is the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities of the 
year divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. Flows is the net growth in total net assets under 
management of the fund over the past year. Volatility (%) is the standard deviation of monthly net fund returns over 
the past 12 months for the fund. FC is the dummy variable which equals one if the fund is in a financial center and 
zero otherwise. Financial center funds have headquarters located within 50 miles of Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
New York, Philadelphia, or San Francisco. Tenure is the number of years the fund manager remains with the fund. 
SAT is the SAT score of matriculates of the fund manager’s undergraduate institution. MBA is defined as a dummy 
variable which equals one when a fund manager (or at least one of the team members) has MBA degree and zero 
otherwise. MAge is the log of fund manager’s age in current year. All regression specifications include time and 
investment objective fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports 
the p-values of coefficients, the number of observations and the adjusted R2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Effect of team size on fund performance 
 
 
 (4U) (4C) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2 Managers 0.0121 0.0124 0.0307* 0.0058 0.0073 0.0304 
 (0.317) (0.336) (0.091) (0.653) (0.600) (0.119) 
3 Managers 0.0359** 0.0320** 0.0405* 0.0384** 0.0388** 0.0499** 
 (0.015) (0.045) (0.065) (0.016) (0.021) (0.032) 
4 Managers 0.0155 -0.0068 0.0154 0.0230 0.0052 0.0392 
 (0.516) (0.737) (0.526) (0.373) (0.802) (0.126) 
5+ Managers 0.0305** 0.0328* 0.0291 0.0236 0.0307* 0.0361 
 (0.043) (0.050) (0.184) (0.151) (0.093) (0.123) 
Fund Sizei,t-1  -0.0216*** -0.0249***  -0.0232*** -0.0209*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Fund Agei,t  -0.0140* -0.0288***  -0.0140 -0.0386*** 
  (0.079) (0.003)  (0.101) (0.000) 
Family Sizei,t-1  0.0103*** 0.0108***  0.0106*** 0.0078* 
  (0.001) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.068) 
Expensesi,t-1  -0.0421** -0.0523***  -0.0373** -0.0465** 
  (0.011) (0.009)  (0.040) (0.031) 
Turnoveri,t-1  -0.0003*** -0.0002*  -0.0002* -0.0000 
  (0.006) (0.082)  (0.071) (0.774) 
Volatilityi,t-1  -0.0112** -0.0071  0.0236*** 0.0257*** 
  (0.033) (0.325)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Flowsi,t-1  -0.0004 0.0003  -0.0030 -0.0038 
  (0.879) (0.924)  (0.304) (0.282) 
FCi  -0.0050 -0.0081  -0.0051 0.0107 
  (0.651) (0.565)  (0.665) (0.484) 
Tenurei,t   0.0057***   0.0069*** 
   (0.001)   (0.000) 
SATi,t   0.0201***   0.0177*** 
   (0.002)   (0.008) 
MBAi,t   0.0028   -0.0099 
   (0.879)   (0.627) 
MAgei,t   -0.1054**   -0.1314*** 
   (0.012)   (0.002) 
Constant -0.0772*** 0.2731*** 0.4536** -0.0292 0.2131*** 0.4870** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.015) (0.192) (0.006) (0.016) 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 11.13 11.96 12.83 11.20 12.39 13.28 
Obs. 25,908 19,555 11,534  25,908 19,555 11,534 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
 
This table shows the effect of team size on fund performance using the Morningstar U.S. domestic equity mutual 
fund sample from 1992 to 2010. It reports the estimates from panel regressions of fund performance on team size 
and other controls. The dependent variable includes two risk-adjusted performance measures, (4U) and (4C). 
(4U) and (4C) are the monthly risk-adjusted net fund returns using unconditional and conditional versions of 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model, respectively. 2 Managers is a dummy variable which equals one if the fund has 
two fund managers at the end of calendar year and zero otherwise; 3 Managers is a dummy variable which equals 
one if the fund has three fund managers at the end of calendar year and zero otherwise; 4 Managers is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the fund has four fund managers at the end of calendar year and zero otherwise; 5+ 
Managers is a dummy variable which equals one if the fund has five (or more) fund managers at the end of calendar 
year and zero otherwise. Other independent variables include various fund and manager characteristics as controls. 
Fund Size is the log of total net assets under management of the fund. Fund Age is the log of the difference between 
the fund’s inception year and the current year. Family Size is the log of total net asset under management of the 
fund’s family. Expenses is the annual total expense ratio of the fund. Turnover is the minimum of aggregated sales 
or aggregated purchases of securities of the year divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. Flows 
is the net growth in total net assets under management of the fund over the past year. Volatility (%) is the standard 
deviation of monthly net fund returns over the past 12 months for the fund. FC is the dummy variable which equals 
one if the fund is in a financial center and zero otherwise. Financial center funds have their advisors located within 
50 miles of Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, or San Francisco. Tenure is the number of 
years the fund manager remains with the fund. SAT is the SAT score (divided by 100) of matriculates of the fund 
manager’s undergraduate institution. MBA is defined as a dummy variable which equals one when a fund manager 
(or at least one of the team members) has MBA degree and zero otherwise. MAge is the log of fund manager’s age 
in current year. All regression specifications include time and investment objective fixed effects and the standard 
errors are clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports the p-values of coefficients, the number of 
observations and the adjusted R2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Interaction of team and location on fund performance 
 
 
 (4U) (4C) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Teami,t 0.0095 -0.0052 0.0144 -0.0089 -0.0152 0.0092 
 (0.572) (0.774) (0.551) (0.612) (0.417) (0.725) 
Teami,t FCi 0.0222 0.0400* 0.0290 0.0469** 0.0578** 0.0475 
 (0.286) (0.076) (0.326) (0.033) (0.016) (0.138) 
FCi -0.0124 -0.0290 -0.0278 -0.0267 -0.0401** -0.0223 
 (0.459) (0.127) (0.284) (0.129) (0.046) (0.431) 
Fund Sizei,t-1  -0.0212*** -0.0253***  -0.0226*** -0.0210*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Fund Agei,t  -0.0135* -0.0280***  -0.0137 -0.0376*** 
  (0.088) (0.004)  (0.105) (0.000) 
Family Sizei,t-1  0.0106*** 0.0111***  0.0108*** 0.0082* 
  (0.000) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.054) 
Expensesi,t-1  -0.0414** -0.0535***  -0.0368** -0.0477** 
  (0.0114) (0.0071)  (0.041) (0.026) 
Turnoveri,t-1  -0.0271*** -0.0238*  -0.0186* -0.0039 
  (0.005) (0.0763)  (0.084) (0.780) 
Volatilityi,t-1  -0.0112** -0.0069  0.0235*** 0.0260*** 
  (0.033) (0.3373)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Flowsi,t-1  -0.0000 0.0009  -0.0026 -0.0032 
  (0.996) (0.805)  (0.365) (0.371) 
Tenurei,t   0.0059***   0.0070*** 
   (0.001)   (0.000) 
SATi,t   0.0211***   0.0186*** 
   (0.001)   (0.005) 
MBAi,t   0.0017   -0.0072 
   (0.926)   (0.717) 
MAgei,t   -0.1033**   -0.1311*** 
   (0.012)   (0.002) 
Constant 0.0911*** 0.1689** 0.4460** 0.1028*** 0.0387 0.4849** 
 (0.005) (0.031) (0.016) (0.003) (0.648) (0.016) 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 11.29 11.91 12.77 11.33 12.34 13.26 
Obs. 24,714 19,781 11,646  24,714 19,781 11,646 
F-test: FC (Team - Single) 0.0317** 0.0348** 0.0434** 0.0380*** 0.0426*** 0.0567*** 
p-value (0.013) (0.011) (0.026) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
F-test: NFC (Team - Single) 0.0095 -0.0052 0.0144 -0.0089 -0.0152 0.0092 
p-value (0.572) (0.774) (0.551) (0.612) (0.417) (0.725) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
 
This table shows the impact of management structure and fund location interaction has on fund performance using 
the Morningstar U.S. domestic equity mutual fund sample from 1992 to 2010. It reports the estimates from panel 
regressions of fund performance on Team and Financial Center location and other controls. Panel A reports the 
regression results using the entire sample, while Panel B reports the results across four different investment 
categories of Aggressive Growth, Growth, Growth & Income, and Equity Income. The dependent variable includes 
two performance measures, (4U) and (4C), which are the monthly risk-adjusted net fund returns using 
unconditional and conditional versions of Carhart (1997) four-factor model, respectively. Independent variables of 
interest are TeamFC, Team, and FC, where Team is defined as a dummy variable which equals one if the fund has 
two (or more) fund managers and zero otherwise, while FC is a dummy variable which equals one if the fund is 
located in a financial center and zero otherwise. Financial center funds have their advisors located within 50 miles of 
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, or San Francisco. Other independent variables are defined 
as in Tables 3-6. All regression specifications include time and investment objective fixed effects and the standard 
errors are clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports the p-values of coefficients, the number of 
observations and the adjusted R2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Effect of team diversity on fund performance across geographic locations 
  
  Financial Centers  Non-Financial Centers 
 (4U) (4C) (4U) (4C) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tenure Diversityi,t -0.0290 0.0093 -0.0657 -0.0229 0.0351 0.0772 0.0805 0.1225** 
 (0.515) (0.838) (0.167) (0.643) (0.499) (0.166) (0.155) (0.049) 
SAT Diversityi,t -0.6243** -0.6434** -0.8084*** -1.0662*** 0.0325 0.0066 -0.0126 -0.0395 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.007) (0.000) (0.938) (0.988) (0.977) (0.933) 
MAge Diversityi,t -0.4225** -0.3695** -0.5429*** -0.4976*** 0.2100 0.2642 0.1042 0.1605 
 (0.027) (0.047) (0.002) (0.003) (0.202) (0.110) (0.552) (0.353) 
Team Sizei,t  0.0047  0.0193  -0.0488**  -0.0235 
  (0.815)  (0.377)  (0.037)  (0.357) 
Fund Sizei,t-1  -0.0227**  -0.0161  -0.0208*  -0.0250* 
  (0.029)  (0.180)  (0.097)  (0.064) 
Fund Agei,t  -0.0196  -0.0198  -0.1047***  -0.0937*** 
  (0.375)  (0.398)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Family Sizei,t-1  0.0117  -0.0003  0.0161  0.0173 
  (0.259)  (0.976)  (0.179)  (0.178) 
Expensesi,t-1  -0.1558***  -0.1473***  -0.0318  -0.0299 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.541)  (0.607) 
Turnoveri,t-1  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0003 
  (0.178)  (0.447)  (0.290)  (0.464) 
Volatilityi,t-1  -0.0159  0.0317**  -0.0097  0.0304* 
  (0.252)  (0.013)  (0.565)  (0.055) 
Flowsi,t-1  0.0061  0.0075  0.0065  0.0081 
  (0.657)  (0.575)  (0.454)  (0.417) 
Tenurei,t  0.0019  -0.0173  0.0681***  0.0562** 
  (0.909)  (0.352)  (0.003)  (0.021) 
SATi,t  0.0111**  0.0158***  0.0174***  0.0175*** 
  (0.018)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
MBAi,t  0.0449  0.0688  0.0112  -0.0365 
  (0.458)  (0.349)  (0.881)  (0.642) 
MAgei,t  -0.4275***  -0.4131***  -0.2509**  -0.2450** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.030)  (0.035) 
Constant 0.2798*** 1.7039*** 0.3243*** 1.7141*** -0.0387 0.1286 -0.0714 -0.0957 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.740) (0.805) (0.564) (0.859) 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund)  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 15.14% 16.59% 17.40% 18.35% 13.18% 15.79% 15.39% 17.83% 
Obs. 1,924 1,667 1,924 1,667  1,350 1,214 1,350 1,214 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
 
This table shows the impact of team diversity on fund performance across fund locations using the Morningstar U.S. 
domestic equity mutual fund sample from 1992 to 2010. It reports the estimates from panel regressions of fund 
performance on three team diversity measures across funds located in financial centers and other places. The 
dependent variable includes two performance measures, (4U) and (4C), which are the monthly risk-adjusted net 
fund returns using unconditional and conditional versions of Carhart (1997) four-factor model, respectively. 
Independent variables of interest are Tenure Diversity, measured by the coefficient of variation of all managers’ 
tenure with the fund in a team; SAT Diversity, measured by the coefficient of variation of all managers’ SAT scores 
within a team; and Manager Age (MAge) Diversity, measured by coefficient of variation of all fund managers’ age 
(in years) within a team. Team Size equals the number of fund managers within a team in a given year. For teams 
with four or more managers the Team Size equals four. Other independent variables are defined as in Tables 3-6. 
Financial center funds have their advisors located within 50 miles of Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, 
Philadelphia, or San Francisco. All regression specifications include time and investment objective fixed effects and 
the standard errors are clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports the p-values of coefficients, the number 
of observations and the adjusted R2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Effect of team management on risk-taking behavior  
 
 
  
  
   CAPM Unconditional Carhart Model 
Total Risk   Mrk1 IdoVol1 Mrk4 SMB HML MOM IdVol4 
Teami,t 0.0797  0.0102 0.0569 0.0096 0.0267* 0.0301** -0.0030 -0.0061 
 (0.180)  (0.385) (0.137) (0.216) (0.056) (0.044) (0.699) (0.787) 
Fund Sizei,t-1 0.0490***  0.0144*** -0.0146 0.0087*** -0.0037 -0.0064 0.0008 -0.0200*** 
 (0.002)  (0.000) (0.201) (0.000) (0.296) (0.124) (0.735) (0.005) 
Fund Agei,t -0.1058***  -0.0128* -0.0901*** -0.0026 -0.0252*** -0.0226*** 0.0103** -0.0428*** 
 (0.002)  (0.062) (0.000) (0.580) (0.001) (0.007) (0.027) (0.001) 
Expensesi,t-1 0.3180***  0.0509*** 0.3614*** 0.0042 0.1106*** -0.0330* -0.0010 0.2253*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.637) (0.000) (0.071) (0.919) (0.000) 
Turnoveri,t-1 0.3300***  0.0806*** 0.2109*** 0.0330*** 0.0798*** -0.0888*** 0.0668*** 0.1001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FCi, 0.0013  0.0105 -0.0292 0.0080 0.0059 -0.0066 0.0029 -0.0299 
 (0.980)  (0.338) (0.422) (0.267) (0.666) (0.662) (0.707) (0.163) 
SATi,t -0.0159  -0.0011 -0.0355** 0.0018 -0.0049 0.0066 -0.0049 -0.0146 
 (0.478)  (0.817) (0.023) (0.558) (0.389) (0.322) (0.108) (0.132) 
Tenurei,t 0.0032  -0.0014 0.0225*** -0.0027*** 0.0064*** 0.0039** -0.0015 0.0144*** 
 (0.608)  (0.297) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.022) (0.109) (0.000) 
MBAi,t -0.1129  -0.0194 -0.0977** -0.0003 -0.0171 0.0110 0.0143 -0.0859*** 
 (0.140)  (0.187) (0.046) (0.973) (0.283) (0.525) (0.122) (0.004) 
MAgei,t -0.1954  -0.0528* -0.0724 -0.0213 -0.0680** 0.0705* -0.0279 -0.0142 
 (0.175)  (0.075) (0.448) (0.276) (0.044) (0.065) (0.159) (0.801) 
Constant 3.4496***  1.1181*** 2.7306*** 0.7849*** 0.8407*** -0.2474 0.2991*** 1.4975*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.151) (0.001) (0.000) 
Time & Obj. FE Yes   Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund) Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 58.00  18.56 45.46 6.90 31.71 12.12 10.03 33.15 
Obs. 12,891   12,286 12,286  12,286 12,286 12,286 12,286 12,286 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
 
This table shows the effect of management structure on risk-taking behavior of mutual funds using the Morningstar 
(MS) U.S. domestic equity mutual fund sample from 1992 to 2010. The table reports the estimates from panel 
regressions of fund risk-taking on Team and other controls. The dependent variable includes different measures of 
risks. Total Risk is defined as the standard deviation of monthly net fund returns over the past twelve months. Mrk1 
is the market risk defined as the coefficient of the market portfolio based on the CAPM performance evaluation 
model. IdVol1 is the standard deviation of the fund’s residual return from the CAPM model. Mrk4, SMB, HML, and 
UMD are coefficients of market, size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolios based on the Carhart (1997) four-
factor performance evaluation model. IdVol4 is the standard deviation of the fund’s residual return from the Carhart 
(1997) model. The independent variable of interest is Team, defined as a dummy variable which equals one if the 
fund has two (or more) fund managers and zero if the fund has only one fund manager at the end of calendar year. 
Other independent variables include various fund and manager characteristics as controls. Fund Size is the log of 
total net assets under management of the fund. Fund Age is the log of the difference between the fund’s inception 
year and the current year. Family Size is the log of total net asset under management of the fund’s family. Expenses 
is the annual total expense ratio of the fund. Turnover is the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases 
of securities of the year divided by the average 12-month total net assets of the fund. FC is the dummy variable 
which equals one if the fund is in a financial center and zero otherwise. Financial center funds have headquarters 
located within 50 miles of Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, or San Francisco. Tenure is the 
number of years the fund manager remains with the fund. SAT is the SAT score (divided by 100) of matriculates of 
the fund manager’s undergraduate institution. MBA is defined as a dummy variable which equals one when a fund 
manager (or at least one of the team members) has MBA degree and zero otherwise. MAge is the log of fund 
manager’s age in current year. All regression specifications include time and investment objective fixed effects and 
the standard errors are clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports the p-values of coefficients, the number 
of observations and the adjusted R2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Effect of team management on fund characteristics 
 
 
 Expenses Turnover Fund Size Flows 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
Teami,t -0.0415*** -0.0252** -0.0198 -0.0578*** -0.0551** -0.1243*** 0.1446** 0.0071 0.0216* 0.0391 0.0449** 0.0757** 
 (0.002) (0.043) (0.273) (0.004) (0.012) (0.000) (0.028) (0.410) (0.081) (0.184) (0.043) (0.020) 
Fund Sizei,t-1  -0.0474*** -0.0527***  -5.7641*** -5.0287***  0.9300*** 0.9313***  -0.2245*** -0.2210*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Fund Agei,t  0.0064 -0.0117  -1.4391 1.7573  -0.0341*** -0.0456***  -0.0733*** -0.0993*** 
  (0.544) (0.397)  (0.350) (0.310)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Family Sizei,t-1  -0.0245*** -0.0134***  3.6593*** 1.7497**  0.0305*** 0.0294***  0.0922*** 0.0843*** 
  (0.000) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.021)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnoveri,t-1  0.0004*** 0.0003**     -0.0167** -0.0046  -0.0139 0.0109 
  (0.000) (0.013)     (0.012) (0.572)  (0.417) (0.656) 
Volatilityi,t-1  0.0244*** 0.0231***  6.3197*** 6.5111***  -0.0130*** -0.0156***  -0.0055 0.0007 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.493) (0.936) 
Flowsi,t-1  -0.0049*** -0.0052***  -0.0378 0.1958  0.0367*** 0.0413***    
  (0.001) (0.010)  (0.885) (0.557)  (0.000) (0.000)    
FCi  0.0154 0.0060  12.2349*** 12.8597***  -0.0118 -0.0047  -0.0142 -0.0028 
  (0.320) (0.753)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.194) (0.685)  (0.547) (0.923) 
Expensesi,t-1     13.8426*** 10.5228***  -0.0543*** -0.0601***  -0.1940*** -0.1882*** 
     (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
(4U)i,t-1           0.1982*** 0.2158*** 
           (0.000) (0.000) 
Obj. Flowi,t-1           0.1732** 0.1598 
           (0.024) (0.118) 
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Table 10 (continued)  
 
 
SATi,t   0.0032   -1.8259   0.0196***   0.0416*** 
   (0.152)   (0.150)   (0.000)   (0.003) 
Tenurei,t   -0.0001   -2.6835***   0.0066***   0.0111*** 
   (0.163)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001) 
MBAi,t   0.0095   4.7310   0.0042   0.0012 
   (0.623)   (0.145)   (0.758)   (0.970) 
MAgei,t   0.0527   -29.9353***   -0.0100   -0.0502 
   (0.230)   (0.000)   (0.744)   (0.567) 
Constant 1.4001*** 2.5953*** 2.4249*** 88.4358*** 72.3038*** 240.336*** 18.2010*** 1.2948*** 0.7318*** 0.4833*** 2.7956*** 2.5307*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Time & Obj. FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster (Fund) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (%) 4.10 17.96 16.57 2.91 9.38 13.57 1.35 93.18 92.96 0.64 9.59 9.87 
Obs. 30,058 22,407 13,279  30,632 20,854 12,312  34,042 20,566 12,136  28,444 20,565 12,135 
 
This table shows the effect of management structure on different fund characteristics of U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from 1992 to 2010. The table reports 
panel regressions estimates of different fund characteristics on Team and other controls. The dependent variable includes: Expenses, defined as the annual total 
expense ratio of the fund; Turnover, defined as the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities of the year divided by the average 12-
month total net assets of the fund; Fund Size, defined as the log of total net assets under management of the fund; and Flows, defined as the net growth in total 
net assets under management of the fund over the past year. The independent variable of interest is Team, defined as a dummy variable which equals one if the 
fund has two (or more) fund managers and zero if the fund has only one fund manager at the end of calendar year. Other independent variables include various 
fund and manager characteristics as controls. Fund Age is the log of the difference between the fund’s inception year and the current year. (4U) is the monthly 
risk-adjusted net fund return using Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Family Size is the log of total net asset under management of the fund’s family. Volatility 
(%) is the standard deviation of monthly net fund returns over the past 12 months for the fund. FC is the dummy variable which equals one if the fund is a 
financial center fund and zero otherwise. Financial center funds have headquarters located within 50 miles of Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, 
Philadelphia, or San Francisco. Tenure is the number of years the fund manager remains with the fund. SAT is the SAT score of matriculates of the fund 
manager’s undergraduate institution. MBA is defined as a dummy variable which equals one when a fund manager (or at least one of the team members) has 
MBA degree and zero otherwise. MAge is the log of fund manager’s age in current year. All regression specifications include time and investment objective 
fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by fund. Each regression model also reports the p-values of coefficients, the number of observations and the 
adjusted R2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 59
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of mutual fund management structure from 1992 to 2010. 
This figure shows the percentage of single-managed and team-managed funds along with the total number of funds in our sample for 1992 to 2010. The left-hand 
side vertical axis represents the percentage of single- and team-managed funds out of the total funds in our sample each year. The right-hand side vertical axis 
represents the total of funds in our sample each year. The horizontal axis represents each year included in our sample.     
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